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Abstract
This paper examines occupational choices using a discrete choice model that
accounts for the fact that self-reported occupation data is measured with error.
Despite evidence from validation studies which suggests that there is a substan-
tial amount of measurement error in self-reported occupations, existing research
has not corrected for classication error when estimating models of occupational
choice. This paper develops a panel data model of occupational choices that
corrects for misclassication in occupational choices and measurement error in
occupation-specic work experience variables. The model is used to estimate
the extent of measurement error in self-reported occupation data and quantify
the bias that results from ignoring measurement error in occupation codes when
studying the determinants of occupational choices and estimating the e¤ects of
occupation-specic human capital on wages. The parameter estimates reveal
that 9% of occupational choices in the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth are misclassied. Ignoring misclassication biases the median
parameter in the occupational choice model by 25%.
JEL codes: J24, C25, C15
Keywords: Occupational choice, Misclassication, Discrete choice, Simula-
tion methods
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1 Introduction
Occupational choices have been the subject of considerable research interest by economists be-
cause of their importance in shaping employment outcomes and wages over the career. Topics
of study range from the analysis of job search and occupational matching (McCall 1990, Neal
1999) to studies of the determinants of wage inequality (Gould 2002) to dynamic human capital
models of occupational choices (Keane and Wolpin 1997). Despite the large amount of research
into occupational choices and evidence from validation studies such as Mellow and Sider (1983)
which suggests that as many as 20% of one-digit occupational choices are misclassied, it is
surprising that existing research has not corrected for classication error in occupations when
estimating models of occupational choice. The existence of classication error in occupations is a
serious concern because in the context of a nonlinear discrete choice occupational choice model,
measurement error in the dependant variable results in biased parameter estimates.1
This paper develops a panel data model of occupational choices that corrects for the mea-
surement error in the dependant variable created by misclassication of occupations, estimates
the extent of misclassication in the data, and demonstrates the substantial bias in parameter
estimates caused by ignoring classication error when estimating an occupational choice model.
The estimation method developed in this paper also employs simulation methods to correct
for measurement error in the occupation specic work experience variables used as explanatory
variables in the model.
The classication error literature consists of two broadly dened approaches to estimating
parametric models in the presence of classication error.2 One approach uses assumptions about
1See Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for a discussion of the e¤ects of measurement error in dependant
and independent variables for both linear and nonlinear models.
2An alternative approach to dealing with misclassication derives nonparametric bounds under relatively
weak assumptions about misclassication. See, for example, Bollingers (1996) study of mismeasurered binary
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the measurement error process along with auxiliary information on error rates, which typically
takes the form of validation or re-interview data, to correct for classication error. Examples
of this approach to measurement error are found in work by Abowd and Zellner (1985), Chua
and Fuller (1987), Poterba and Summers (1995), Magnac and Visser (1999), and Chen, Hong,
and Tamer (2005). The second approach to estimating models in the presence of misclassied
data corrects for misclassication without relying on auxiliary information. Examples of this
approach are found in Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) who develop a maximum
likelihood estimator that corrects for misclassication in the dependant variable of a binary choice
model, and Li, Trivedi, and Guo (2003) who estimate a count model with misclassication. A
related methodology is employed by Dustmann and van Soest (2001), who estimate a model of
the relationship between language uency and earnings that corrects for misclassication in self
reported language uency.
The occupational choice model developed in this paper combines features of the two existing
approaches to misclassication. Instead of relying solely on auxiliary information that provides
direct evidence on misclassied occupational choices, information about misclassication is de-
rived from observed wages. This approach takes advantage of the fact that observed wages
provide information about true occupational choices because wages vary widely across occupa-
tions. Intuitively, the occupational choices identied by the model as likely to be misclassied are
the ones where the observed wage is unlikely to be observed in the reported occupation. Also,
the model developed in this paper uses additional information provided by the fact that true
occupational choices are strongly inuenced by observable variables such as education to draw
inferences about the extent of misclassication in the data.
The model of occupational choices presented in this paper builds on the models of self selec-
independent variables in a linear regression, and Kreider and Peppers (2004A, 2004B) work on misclassication
in disability status.
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tion in sectoral and occupational choices used by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985,1990) and Gould
(2002). Workers in the model self select into one-digit occupations based on their skills and pref-
erences which inuence the wages and non-pecuniary utility received while employed in each of
the eight occupations in the economy. The model expands on previous occupational choice mod-
els by explicitly allowing for misclassication in observed occupational choices by incorporating
misclassication probabilities that indicate the probability of observing a worker in each occupa-
tion conditional on the workers actual occupational choice. The misclassication probabilities
are estimated along with the other parameters of the model, and these estimates provide direct
evidence on the extent of misclassication in the data as well as information about the patterns
of misclassication between occupations. In addition, the model allows misclassication rates to
be heterogenous across people. It is necessary to control for this person-specic heterogeneity
because in panel data, some individuals may persistently provide poor descriptions of their oc-
cupations that are likely to be misclassied when these verbatim descriptions are translated into
occupation codes.3
One key contribution of this work is that it develops a method of dealing with the problems
created in panel data models when misclassication in the dependant variable creates measure-
ment error in the explanatory variables in the model. This situation arises in a panel data
occupational choice model because when a current period occupational choice is misclassied it
creates measurement error in future occupation specic work experience variables.4 This prob-
lem has not been addressed in existing models of misclassication or in the occupational choice
literature. It is addressed in this work by using the model of misclassication to derive the dis-
3See Dustmann and van Soest (2001) for a model of misclassication applied to panel data that allows for
person-specic heterogeneity in propensity to falsely report language uency.
4This is the case because the amount of occupation specic work experience that a worker has accumulated as
of year t in occupation q is simply the total number of times that the individual reported working in occupation
q in the previous years.
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tribution of true occupation specic work experience conditional on the observed occupational
choices, wages, and other explanatory variables in the model. The distribution of the true oc-
cupation specic experience variables for a given person is used to integrate out the e¤ects of
measurement error on each individuals likelihood contribution. This approach creates serious
computational problems because treating occupation specic work experience as an unobserved
state variable creates a likelihood function composed of high dimensions integrals that are ex-
tremely di¢ cult to evaluate. This research addresses this problem by employing recent advances
in integral simulation techniques to approximate the otherwise intractable integrals over the
distribution of true occupation specic experience that appear in the likelihood function. This
application of simulation methods adds to a growing literature that uses simulation methods
to solve problems created by missing data and measurement error.5 The simulation algorithm
developed in this paper is applicable in a wide range of settings beyond occupational choice
models. For example, a natural application of these techniques would be to studies of labor
force participation or unemployment, where current labor force status is measured with error
and accumulated work experience impacts the probability of employment.
The parameter estimates show that a substantial fraction of occupational choices (9%) are
misclassied in the NLSY data. The extent of misclassication varies widely across occupations,
with 96% of craftsmen classied in the correct occupation, while only 77% of service workers
are correctly classied. The estimates also indicate that observed wages provide a large amount
of information about which occupational choices in the data are likely to be a¤ected by mis-
classication. For example, the model predicts that 91% of professionals with reported wages
in the top 10% of the professional wage distribution are correctly classied as professionals, but
5For example, Lavy, Palumbo, and Stern (1998) and Stinebrickner (1999) use simulation methods to solve
estimation problems created by missing data, and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2004) develop a model of
college outcomes that uses simulation methods to correct for measurement error in self-reported study time.
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only 75% of those observed in the bottom 10% of the professional wage distribution are correctly
classied as professionals. There is a similarly strong and intuitively plausible relationship be-
tween education and misclassication in occupation codes. For example, 71:8% of workers who
are correctly classied as professionals graduated from college, while only 30:2% of workers who
are incorrectly classied as professionals graduated from college.
The bias caused by ignoring classication error when estimating a one-digit occupational
choice model is substantial. The average parameter is biased by 60% when classication error is
ignored, while the median parameter is biased by 25%. The largest biases are found in parameters
that measure the transferability of occupation specic human capital across occupations. For
example, ignoring misclassication in occupation codes overstates the e¤ect of experience as a
craftsman or operative on wages in the professional occupation by 38% and 73%, respectively.
Classication error in occupations creates serious bias in estimates of the parameters of an
occupational choice model, so researchers should be careful to examine the robustness of their
results to misclassication when studying occupational choices and the returns to occupation
specic human capital.6
An additional application of the model developed in this paper is that it can be used to
simulate occupational choice data that is free from misclassication, because estimating the
model recovers the distribution of true occupational choices conditional on observed occupational
choices and wages. This simulated data can be used in place of the noisy occupational choice
data in a wide range of applications, ranging from simple descriptive analyses of the patterns in
occupational mobility to estimation of dynamic structural models of occupational choices.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the
6While estimating the returns to rm specic and general work experience has long been a major research
topic for economists, in recent years attention has turned to the importance of occupation and industry specic
work experience. See, for example, Neal (1995), Parent (2000), and Kambourov and Manovskii (2006).
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data. Section 3 presents the occupational choice model with misclassication, and Section 4
presents the parameter estimates. Section 5 discusses how the model can be used to simulate
occupational choice data that is free from misclassication and examines the simulated data.
Section 6 concludes examines the sensitivity of the results to the existence of measurement error
in wages, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) is a panel dataset that contains detailed
information about the employment and educational experiences of a nationally representative
sample of young men and women who were between the ages of 14 and 21 when rst interviewed
in 1979. The employment data contains information about the durations of employment spells
along with the wages, hours, and three-digit 1970 U.S. Census occupation codes for each job.
This analysis uses only white men ages 18 or older from the nationally representative core
sample of the NLSY. Individuals who ever report serving in the military, working as farmers, or
being self-employed are excluded from the sample. The NLSY work history les are used to con-
struct a monthly history of each individuals primary employment using the weekly employment
records. This analysis considers only full time employment, which is dened as a job where the
weekly hours worked are at least 20. The intent of this analysis is to follow workers from the
time they make a permanent transition to the labor market and start their career. There is no
clear best way to identify this transition to the labor market, so this analysis follows people from
the month they reach age 18 or stop attending school, whichever occurs later. Individuals are
followed until they reach age 35, or exit from the sample due to missing data.
The weekly labor force record is aggregated into a monthly employment record based on the
number of weeks worked in each full time job in each month. An individuals primary job for
6
each month is dened as the one in which the most weeks were spent during that month. The
monthly employment record is used to create a running tally of accumulated work experience in
each occupation for each worker.
Descriptions of the one-digit occupation classications along with average wages are presented
in Table 1a. The highest paid workers are professional and managerial workers, while the lowest
paid workers are found in the service occupation. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table
1b. There are 954 individuals in the sample who contribute a total of 10,573 observations to the
data. On average, each individual contributes approximately 11 observations to the data.
2.1 Measurement Error in Occupation Codes & Descriptive Statistics
The NLSY provides the U.S. Census occupation codes for each job. Interviewers question respon-
dents about the occupation of each job held during the year with the following two questions:
What kind of work do you do? That is, what is your occupation? Coders use these descriptions
to classify each job using the three-digit Census occupation coding scheme. Misclassication
of occupation codes may arise from errors made by respondents when describing their job, or
from errors made by coders when interpreting these descriptions. Evidence on the extent of
misclassication is provided by Mellow and Sider (1983), who perform a validation study of
occupation codes using occupation codes found in the CPS matched with employer reports of
their employees occupation. They nd agreement rates for occupation codes of 58% at the
three digit level and 81% at the one digit level. As one would expect, there appears to be less
measurement error in the fairly broadly dened one digit classications compared to the more
narrowly dened three digit groupings. Additional evidence on measurement error in occupation
codes is presented by Mathiowetz (1992). Mathiowetz (1992) independently creates one and
three-digit occupation codes based on occupational descriptions from employees of a large man-
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ufacturing rm and job descriptions found in these workers personnel les. The agreement rate
between these independently coded one-digit occupation codes is 76%, while the agreement rate
for three-digit codes is only 52%. In addition to comparing the three and one-digit occupation
codes produced by independent coding, Mathiowetz (1992) also conducts a direct comparison of
the company record with the employees occupational description to see if the two sources could
be classied as same three-digit occupation. This direct comparison results in an agreement rate
of 87% at the three-digit level.
Table 1a lists the one digit occupation classications used throughout this study along with
the mean wage in each occupation. Average wages vary widely across occupations, with managers
earning the highest average hourly wage of $12.89, and service workers earning the lowest wage
of $6.34. Table 2 provides information about occupational mobility in the form of a transition
matrix. The top entry in each cell represents the percentage of employment spells in the NLSY
data that start in the left column occupation and end in the top row occupation. Table 2 shows
that persistence in occupational choices varies widely across occupations. For example, 74.7% of
professionals remain in the professional occupation from one employment spell to the next, while
only 36.2% of laborers remain in the laborer occupation from one spell to the next. Mobility
occurs frequently between the closely related blue collar occupations of operatives, craftsmen,
and laborers. Mobility is also quite common from the sales to managerial occupation, although
mobility in the opposite direction is roughly half as common.
3 Occupational Choice Model with Misclassication
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3.1 A Baseline Model of Misclassication
The model of occupational choices developed in this paper builds on previous models of sectoral
and occupational choices such as Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, 1990) and Gould (2002). These
models are all based on the framework of self selection in occupational choices introduced by Roy
(1951). Let V iqt represent the utility that worker i receives from working in occupation q at time
period t. Let N represent the number of people in the sample, let T (i) represent the number
of time periods that person i in the sample, and let Q represent the number of occupations.
Assume that the value of working in each occupation is the following function of the wage and
non-pecuniary utility,
V iqt = wiqt +Hiqt + "iqt; (1)
where wiqt is the log wage of person i in occupation q at time t; Hiqt is the non-pecuniary utility
that person i receives from working in occupation q at time t, and "iqt is an error term that
captures variation in the utility ow from working in occupation q caused by factors that are
observed by the worker but unobserved by the econometrician.
The log wage equation is
wiqt = iq + Zitq +
QX
k=1
qkExpikt + eiqt; (2)
where iq is the intercept of the log wage equation for person i in occupation q, Zit is a vector
of explanatory variables, and Expikt is person i s experience at time t in occupation k. This
specication allows for a full set of cross-occupation experience e¤ects, so the parameter estimates
provide evidence on the transferability of skills across occupations.7 Note that the commonly
estimated log wage equation which assumes that only total work experience inuences wages,
7See Keane and Wolpin (1997) for an example of a paper that allows for cross-occupation experience e¤ects.
Their occupational choice model allows blue collar and white collar experience to enter into the wage equations
in both the blue and white collar occupations.
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rather than occupation specic work experience, is nested within this specication. Equation (2)
reduces to this standard" wage equation when all the s in the model are equal, (11 = qk; q =
1; :::; Q; k = 1; :::; Q). The nal term, eiqt, represents a random wage shock. The non-pecuniary
utility ow equation is specied as
Hiqt = Xitq +
QX
k=1
qkExpikt +
QX
k=1
qkLastoccikt + iq; (3)
where Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, Expikt is person i s experience at time t in
occupation k, Lastoccikt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if person i worked in occupation k at
time t  1. This variable allows switching occupations to have a direct impact on non-pecuniary
utility, as it would if workers incur non-pecuniary costs when switching occupations. The nal
term, iq; represents person is innate preference for working in occupation q.
Let Oit represent the occupational choice observed in the data for person i at time t. This
variable is an integer that takes a value ranging from 1 to Q. A persons true occupational choice
may di¤er from the one observed in the data if classication error exists. Let bOit represent the
true occupational choice, which is simply the occupation that yields the highest utility,
bOit = q if V iqt = maxfV i1t; V i2t; :::; V iQtg: (4)
The model of misclassication used in this paper builds on the model of misclassication in a
binary dependant variable developed by Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) and the
multinomial logit model with misclassication developed by Poterba and Summers (1995).8 In
this framework the probability of misclassication depends on the value of the latent variable
V iqt. The misclassication probabilities are denoted as
jk = Pr(Oit = j j bOit = k); for j = 1; :::; Q; k = 1; :::; Q: (5)
8An important distinction between these two papers is that Hausman et al. (1998) estimate misclassication
probabilities jointly with the other parameters of their binary choice model, while Poterba and Summers (1995)
consider the case where misclassication rates are known.
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That is, jk represents the probability that the occupation observed in the data is j, conditional
on the actual occupational choice being k. The jj terms are the probabilities that occupational
choices are correctly classied. There are Q  Q misclassication probabilities, but there are
only [(QQ) Q] free parameters because the misclassication probabilities must sum to one
for each possible occupational choice,
QX
j=1
jk = 1; for k = 1; :::; Q: (6)
Throughout this paper the term misclassication probabilities" will be used when refer-
ring to all of the jks, but of course only the terms where j 6= k truly represent misclassication
probabilities, since the terms with j = k are actually "correct classication probabilities." Note
that this occupational choice model nests a standard occupational choice model which assumes
that occupations are always correctly classied. When jj = 1 for (j = 1; :::; Q), and jk = 0
for j 6= k and (j; k = 1; :::; Q), occupations are never misclassied. This model builds on existing
models of misclassication such as Douglas, Smith Conway, and Ferrier (1995), Hausman, Abre-
vaya, and Scott-Morton (1998), and Dustmann and van Soest (2001). Following studies of this
type, the model assumes that the misclassication probabilities fjk : k = 1; ::; Q; j = 1; :::; Qg
depend only on j and k, and not on the other explanatory variables in the model. This is a
standard assumption in this type of model.
One possible shortcoming of this baseline model of occupational misclassication is that it
rules out person specic heterogeneity in the propensity to misclassify occupations that may
be present in panel data such as the NLSY. For example, it is possible that some workers
consistently provide poor descriptions of their occupations over the course of their career which
results in frequent misclassications. On the other hand, other workers may provide very detailed
descriptions that are much less likely to result in misclassication. Section 3.4 of this paper
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presents an extension of the model that allows for this type of within-person correlation in
misclassication rates.
This model of misclassication implies that the occupation specic experience variables,
Expiqt, will be measured with error, since measurement error in a current occupational choice
creates measurement error in future experience variables because the experience variables are
calculated using a workers sequence of observed occupations. This measurement error is non-
classical because it is correlated with observed choices. A method for dealing with this problem
is presented in the next section.
It is necessary to specify the distributions of the error terms in the model before deriving the
likelihood function. Assume that "iqt  iid extreme value and eiqt  N(0; 2eq). Let i represent
a Q 1 vector of person is preferences for working in each occupation, and let i represent the
Q  1 vector of person is log wage intercepts in each occupation. Let F (; ) denote the joint
distribution of the wage intercepts and occupational preferences.
Let  represent the vector of parameters in the model,  = fk; kj; kj; kj; k; jk; ek; F (; ) :
k = 1; :::; Q; j = 1; :::; Qg: Dene bPit(q; wobsit ) as the joint probability that person i chooses to
work in occupation q in time period t and receives a wage of wobsit . For brevity of notation, when
it is convenient I suppress some or all of the arguments f; Zit; Xit; Expikt; Lastoccikt; wobsit g at
some points when writing equations for probabilities and likelihood contributions, even though
the choice probabilities and likelihood contributions are functions of all of these variables. Dene
f(e q) as the joint density of the wage error terms excluding the error term for occupation q.
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The outcome probability is
bPit( q; wobsit j ; ) = Pr(V iqt = maxfV i1t; V i2t; :::; V iQtg \ wiqt = wobsit ) (7)
= Pr(V iqt = maxfV i1t; V i2t; :::; V iQtg j wiqt = wobsit ) Pr(wiqt = wobsit )
=
Z
  
Z
exp(wobsit +Hiqt)
exp(wobsit +Hiqt) +
P
j 6=q exp(wijt +Hijt)
f(e q)de q
1
eq
(
wobsit   iq   Zitq  
PQ
k=1 qkExpikt
eq
) ;
where  represents the standard normal pdf. During the evaluation of the likelihood function
the integral over the distribution of f(e q)de q is simulated by taking random draws from the
distribution and computing the average of bPit( q; wobsit j ; ) over the draws.9 The likelihood
function for the observed data is constructed using the misclassication probabilities and the
true choice probabilities. Dene Pit(q; wobsit ) as the probability that person i is observed working
in occupation q at time period t with a wage of wobsit . This probability is the sum of the true
occupational choice probabilities weighted by the misclassication probabilities,
Pit(q; w
obs
it j ; ) =
QX
k=1
qk bPit(k; wobsit j ; ): (8)
Note that the outcome probability imposes the restriction that the observed wage is drawn
from the workers actual occupation, which rules out situations where a worker intentionally
misrepresents his occupation and simultaneously provides a false wage consistent with the false
occupation. This assumption implies that observed wages provide information about true occu-
pational choices. The likelihood function is simply the product of the probabilities of observing
the sequence of occupational choices observed in the data for each person over the years that
9During estimation, 60 draws are used to simulate the integral. Antithetic acceleration is used to reduce the
variance of the simulated integral. As a check on the sensitivity of the estimates to the number of simulation draws
the optimization routine was re-started using 600 draws. The parameter estimates (and value of the likelihood
function at the maximum) were essentially unchanged by this increase in the number of simulation draws.
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they are in the sample,
L() =
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
QX
q=1
1fOit = qgPit(q; wobsit j ; )dF (; ) (9)
=
NY
i=1
Z
Li(j; )dF (; ); (10)
where 1fg denotes the indicator function which is equal to 1 if its argument is true and 0
otherwise. The likelihood function must be integrated over the joint distribution of skills and
preferences, F (; ). Following Heckman and Singer (1984), this distribution is specied as a
discrete multinomial distribution.10 Suppose that there areM types of people, each with a Q1
vector of wage intercepts m and Q1 vector of preferences m. Let !m represent the proportion
of the mth type in the population. The unconditional likelihood function is simply a weighted
average of the type specic likelihoods,
L() =
NY
i=1
Z
Li(j; )dF (; )
=
NY
i=1
MX
m=1
!mLi( j i = m; i = m)
=
NY
i=1
Li() (11)
3.2 Evaluating the Likelihood Function
The parameters of the model can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function shown in
equation number (11). The major complication arises from the fact that classication error in
occupation codes creates measurement error in the occupation specic work experience variables
and previous occupational choice dummy variables that are used as explanatory variables. This
section describes the relationship between measurement error in occupation codes and measure-
10There is a large literature advocating the use of discrete distributions for unobserved heterogeneity. See, for
example, Mroz (1999).
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ment error in occupation specic work experience variables and explains how simulation methods
can be used to correct for this measurement error during the evaluation of the likelihood function.
The intuition behind this approach is that the model of misclassication of occupational
choices presented in the previous section denes a relationship between the occupational choices
observed in the data and the true occupational choices predicted by the model. This relationship
implies that conditional on the occupational choices, wages, and other explanatory variables ob-
served in the data, the model implies there is a distribution of true values of occupation specic
experience and true lagged occupational choices. The distribution of the true data conditional on
the observed data can be used to integrate out the e¤ects of measurement error. Unfortunately,
the distribution of true lagged occupational choices and experience variables is intractably com-
plex. This work overcomes this limitation by using simulation methods to evaluate the otherwise
intractable integrals that arise when misclassied occupational choices creates measurement error
in explanatory variables.
Let dExpiqt represent person is true experience in occupation q in time period t. Dene
dExpit as a Q  1 vector of experience in each occupation. These experience variables are not
observed in the data, because the data only contains information about reported occupation
specic experience, Expiqt, which is measured with error. Let dLastoccit represent a Q  1
vector of dummy variables where the qth element is equal to 1 if person is true occupational
choice was q in time period t. Let F (dExp; dLastocc) represent the distribution of true occupation
specic experience and lagged occupational choices. This distribution is a function of each
persons observed characteristics, and observed choices and wages. The likelihood function must
be integrated over this distribution when it is evaluated during estimation,
L() =
NY
i=1
Z
Li(jdExp; dLastocc)dF (dExp; dLastocc): (12)
The likelihood function is di¢ cult to evaluate because the distribution of actual occupation
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specic experience and lagged choices is intractably complex, but recent advances in integral
simulation methods provide a way to evaluate the likelihood function. The likelihood function
can be simulated using a modied Geweke (1991), Hajivassiliou (1990), and Keane (1994) (GHK)
algorithm to simulate the likelihood contribution. Simulation methods have not been used ex-
tensively in this manner to solve problems created by measurement error, although it is a natural
application of these techniques.
3.2.1 The Simulation Algorithm
This section provides the details of the simulation algorithm used to evaluate the likelihood
function. For simplicity, the algorithm is outlined for the case where the number of unobserved
heterogeneity types (M) equals one. In the case of multiple types, the algorithm is simply
repeated for each type to obtain the type-specic likelihood contributions found in the likeli-
hood function, because the likelihood function is simply a weighted average of the type-specic
likelihood contributions. The object that must be simulated is
L() =
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
QX
q=1
1fOit = qgPit(q; wobsit j; Zit;Xit;dExpikt; dLastoccikt)dF (dExp; dLastocc)
=
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
Lit(Oit; w
obs
it j; Zit;Xit;dExpikt; dLastoccikt)dF (dExp; dLastocc) (13)
Let variables with a  superscript represent simulated variables, and let r = 1; :::; R in-
dex simulation draws. Using this notation, Oit(rj; Oit; wobsit ; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit) is a sim-
ulated occupational choice, Expit+1(rj;Oit; wobsit ; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit) is a Q  1 vector of
simulated occupation specic experience, and Lastoccit+1(rj; Oit; wobsit ; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit)
is a vector of dummy variables representing the simulated occupational choice in the previ-
ous period, and Lit(r; Oit; w
obs
it j; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit) is a simulated likelihood contribution.
For brevity of notation, dene the set of conditioning variables for the simulated choices as
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 = f; Oit; wobsit ; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccitg. The simulation algorithm for person i is:
1. Start in time period t = 1, simulation draw r = 1. All experience variables equal zero at
the start of the career by denition since the career begins at the rst job, so initialize
the simulated experience vector to zero for time periods t = 1; :::; T : Expi1(r) = 0;and
Lastocci1(r) = 0:
2. Evaluate and store Lit(r; Oit; w
obs
it j; Zit;Xit; Expit(r); Lastoccit(r)): This is the simulated
likelihood contribution for year t, simulation draw r.
3. Compute and store the probability that person is true choice in time period t ( bOit) is each of
the Q possible occupations, conditional on the parameter vector (), observed choice (Oit),
observed wage (wobsit ), explanatory variables (Zit;Xit), and simulated previous occupational
choice (Lastoccit) and experience variables (Exp

it). Let 
it(r; qj) for q = 1; :::; Q represent
the conditional probability for simulation draw r that the true occupational choice is q for
person i in time period t. These probabilities can be written using Bayesrule as a function
of the previously dened outcome probabilities ( bPit()) and misclassication probabilities
(s),

it(r; qj) = Pr( bOit = q j ) (14)
=
Oit;1
bPit(q; wobsit )PQ
k=1 Oit;k
bPit(k; wobsit ) : (15)
Recall that bPit() is a function of all of the variables that 
it() is conditioned on, but
they are suppressed here as they were in equation (7). This implies that the observed wage
and all the explanatory variables provide information about the conditional true choice
probabilities (
it()).
4. Use the Q computed conditional true choice probabilities, 
it(r; qj); to dene the discrete
17
distribution of true occupational choices fPr(Oit = q) = 
it(r; qj)g; q = 1; :::; Qg: Next,
randomly draw a simulated true occupational choice Oit(rj) for person i at time period
t from the discrete distribution of the Q possible true occupational choices.
5. Use the simulated choice Oit(rj) to update the vectors of simulated experience and lagged
occupational choice vectors, Expit+1(rj) and Lastoccit+1(rj): The updating rules are to
increase the element of the experience vector by one in the simulated occupation, and
leave all other elements of the vector unchanged. For the previous occupation dummy, set
the element of the Lastoccit+1 vector corresponding to the simulated occupation in time t
equal to one and set all other elements of the vector to zero. More precisely, increment the
jth element of the vector Expit+1(r) by one if O

it(r) = j, and leave all other elements of
Expit+1(r) unchanged from their values in time period t: Set the jth element in the vector
Lastoccit+1(r) equal to one, and set all other elements of Lastocc

it+1(r) equal to zero.
6. If t = T (i) (the nal time period for person i); go to step 7. Otherwise, Set t = t + 1 and
go back to step 2.
7. Compute the likelihood function for simulated path r,
Lri () =
T (i)Y
t=1
Lit(r; Oit; w
obs
it j; Zit;Xit; Expit; Lastoccit):
8. Repeat this algorithm R times, and the simulated likelihood function is the average of the
R path probabilities over the R draws,
Li () =
1
R
RX
r=1
Lri ():
During estimation, antithetic acceleration is used to reduce the variance of the simulated
integrals. The number of simulation draws is set at R = 60. Increasing the number of simulation
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draws to R = 600 leads to only a :01% change in the value of the likelihood function at the
simulated maximum likelihood parameter estimates.11
3.3 Identication
This section presents the identication conditions for the occupational choice model with mis-
classication and discusses the intuition behind how the misclassication model identies certain
occupational choices as likely to be misclassied.
3.3.1 Identication Conditions
The identication conditions for a model of misclassication in a binary dependant variable are
presented by Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998). This condition is extended to the
case of discrete choice models with more than two outcomes by Ramalho (2002). The parameters
of the model are identied if the sum of the conditional misclassication probabilities for each
observed outcome is smaller than the conditional probability of correct classication. In the
context of the occupational choice model presented in this paper this condition amounts to the
following restriction on the misclassication probabilities,
X
k 6=j
jk < jj; j = 1; :::; Q: (16)
This condition implies that on average, the occupational choices observed in the data are correct.
The intuition behind this identication condition is that it is not possible to estimate the extent
of misclassication along with the rest of the parameter vector if the quality of the data is so poor
that one is more likely to observe a misclassied occupational choice than a correctly classied
occupational choice. A key implication of this identication condition is that when the likelihood
11As a further check on the robustness of the parameter estimates to the choice of R, the model was re-estimated
using R = 30_0. The program converged to essentially the same parameter vector as it did when R = 60 was used.
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function is being maximized during simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimation, the SML
parameter vector is conned to an area of the parameter space where the true occupational
choices generated by the model correspond to those observed in the data to a certain minimum
extent. This rules out extreme situations where misclassication accounts for the majority of the
observed occupational choices in the data. For example, this assumption rules out the extreme
case where the model evaluated at the SML parameter vector assigns extremely low true choice
probabilities to every occupational choice observed in the data and instead accounts for all
observed occupational choices through misclassication.12
3.3.2 An Illustrative Example
This section presents an actual occupational choice sequence drawn from the NLSY and discusses
how the misclassication model uses the predicted true choice probabilities and wage data to
infer the probability that an occupational choice is misclassied. Consider the following sequence
of occupational choices found in the data for a particular person in the NLSY.
Age 24 25 26 27
Observed occupation Professional Craftsman Professional Professional
Observed wage $10.75 $11.85 $13.83 $13.90
Years of College 4 4 4 4
At the time that this person is observed switching from the professional occupation to the
craftsmen occupation he has worked as a professional for two years and has never worked as a
craftsman. In addition, this worker is a college graduate, and college graduates do not typically
12During estimation, the identication constraint (
P
k 6=j jk < jj ; j = 1; :::; Q) was never directly imposed on
the parameter vector. One could do this by parameterizing the s in such a way that the condition is required
to hold, or by adding a penalty function to the likelihood function, but neither of these approaches was used
during estimation. Although it was possible for the identication to be violated during the course of estimation,
in practice this never occured during runs of the estimation program.
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work as craftsmen. Also, the mean wage for a professional is $11.19, while the mean wage for
a craftsman is only $8.53. Given this information, it seems plausible that this transition from
professional to craftsmen employment is a false one created by classication error. From an intu-
itive standpoint, the consistent pattern of this worker choosing professional employment over his
career, the cycling between professional and craftsmen employment, the patterns in the observed
wages, and the relationship between college graduation and occupational choices all combine to
make this a suspicious occupational transition. As the following discussion will demonstrate, the
misclassication model incorporates all of these considerations when it determines whether or
not an occupational choice is likely to be misclassied.
First, consider the information provided by the panel nature of the data. The identication
condition shown in equation 16 implies that on average the occupational choices observed in
the data are correct, so it would require an extremely unlikely sequence of misclassications to
account for a person being falsely observed as a professional over the course of their entire career.
Consistently observing a worker as a professional and observing the associated wages provides
information about a persons ability and preference for professional employment relative to other
occupations.
At this point it is useful to rst examine a simple occupational choice model with misclas-
sication that does not incorporate wage data. This model is the one found in Section 3 under
the restriction that wiqt = 0. For simplicity, suppose that there are only two occupations, where
the professional occupation is dened as occupation 1 and the craftsman occupation is dened
as occupation 2. The probability that this person is observed as a craftsman is
Pit(2) = 22 bPit(2) + 21 bPit(1); (17)
where 22 is the probability that this person is correctly classied as a craftsman and bPit(2) is
the probability that working as a craftsman is the optimal choice. Recall that the true occupa-
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tional choice probabilities ( bPits) are functions of all of the explanatory variables in the model,
such as education. Estimating the parameters of the model with maximum likelihood involves
maximizing a likelihood function composed of observed choice probabilities of this form. The
derivatives of the observed choice probability with respect to the s are
@Pit(2)
@22
= bPit(2) and @Pit(2)
@21
= bPit(1): (18)
This example shows that, roughly speaking, when it is very likely that this person actually
chooses to work in occupation 2 ( bPit(2) is large) this particular persons contribution to the
likelihood function will be maximized by making 22 large. In the context of this example, if
college educated workers are on average very unlikely to work as craftsmen, but very likely to
work as professionals, then bPit(2) will be small relative to bPit(1). This example illustrates that
the estimates of the misclassication probabilities will be determined by the extent to which the
choices observed in the data are likely to be generated as optimal occupational choices by the
model.
One clear shortcoming of the preceding model is that potentially useful information found in
wages is excluded. The outcome probabilities in the model that incorporates wages include the
joint density of observed choices and wages,
Pit(2; w
obs
it = $11:12) = 22 bPit(2; w2 = $11:85) + 21 bPit(1; w1 = $11:85); (19)
where bPit(2; w2 = $11:85) is the joint probability that occupation 2 is the optimal choice and
a wage of $11.85 is observed in occupation 2. The derivatives of this outcome probability with
respect to the as are
@Pit(2)
@22
= bPit(2; w2 = $11:85) and @Pit(2)
@21
= bPit(1; w1 = $11:85): (20)
Once wages are incorporated into the model, the derivatives of the outcome probabilities with
respect to the s depend on the probability of observing a wage of $11.85 in each occupation in
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addition to the choice probabilities predicted by the model, which capture the e¤ect of variables
such as education on true occupational choices. The model takes into account how consistent
the observed wage is with the wage distribution in each occupation while the s are being
estimated. If, for example, a wage of $11.85 is unlikely to be observed in the craftsman occupation
(occupation 2) but is much more likely to be observed in the professional occupation (occupation
1), then 22 should be relatively small, while the misclassication probability 21 should be
relatively large. In addition, the fact that wages vary strongly with occupation specic work
experience provides further variation in the wage distribution across occupations that helps to
identify wages that dont appear to t well in the reported occupation. For example, a craftsman
with 15 years of experience may be fairly likely to earn a wage of $11:85, but it is probably very
unlikely for a person working as a craftsman for the rst time to earn a wage of $11:85 when the
mean wage in the craftsmen occupation is only $8:53. In general, choice-wage combinations where
the reported wage is unlikely to be observed in the reported occupation and where the observed
occupational choice is unlikely to be generated as an optimal choice in the model are the ones
that support the existence of misclassication. Estimates of the misclassication probabilities
will be determined by the likelihood of the choices observed in the data being generated by the
model and by the extent to which observed wages are consistent with reported occupational
choices.
3.4 An Extended Model: Heterogeneity in Misclassication Rates
The model of misclassication presented in Section 3.1 assumes that all individuals have the
same probability of having one of their occupational choices misclassied. In a panel data set-
ting such as the NLSY, it is possible that during the yearly NLSY interviews some individuals
consistently provide poor descriptions of their jobs that are likely to lead to measurement error
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in the occupation codes created by the NLSY coders. On the other hand, some workers may be
more likely to provide accurate descriptions of their occupations that are extremely unlikely to
be misclassied. This type of time-persistent misclassication has been examined by Dustmann
and van Soest (2001) in their model of misclassication of self reported language uency. Dust-
mann and van Soest (2001) allow for several subpopulations who have di¤erent propensities to
over or under report their language uency, and they estimate the subpopulation-specic mis-
classication rates along with the proportions of each subpopulation in the overall population.
The remainder of this section extends the occupational choice model with misclassication to
allow for time persistent misclassication by using an approach similar to the one adopted by
Dustmann and van Soest (2001).
The primary goal of the extended model is to allow for person-specic heterogeneity in mis-
classication rates in a way that results in a tractable empirical model. Suppose that there
are three subpopulations of workers in the economy, and that these subpopulations each have
di¤erent probabilities of having their occupational choices misclassied. Dene the occupational
choice misclassication probabilities for subpopulation y as
jk(y) = Pr(Oit = jj bOit = k); j = 1; :::; Q; k = 1; :::; Q; (21)
QX
j=1
jk(y) = 1; k = 1; :::; Q; y = 1; 2; 3: (22)
Denote the proportion of subpopulation y in the economy as (y); where y = 1; 2; 3 and
3X
y=1
(y) =
1: This specication of the misclassication rates allows for time-persistence in misclassication,
since the jk(y)s are xed over time for each subpopulation. For example, if 11(2) > 11(3),
then conditional on the true occupational choice being occupation 1, a person from subpopulation
2 is always more likely to be correctly classied in occupation 1 over his entire career than a
person from subpopulation 3. Note that there are 3 [(QQ) Q] misclassication probabilities
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that must be estimated when there are three subpopulations in the economy. During estimation
the (y)s and jk(y)s of each subpopulation are estimated along with the other parameters of
the model, so it is necessary to specify the misclassication model in such a way that the number
of parameters in the model does not become unreasonably large. In order to keep the number of
parameters at a tractable level, the number of subpopulations is set to a small number (3), and the
misclassication probabilities are restricted during estimation so that the occupational choices
of subpopulation 1 are always correctly classied. Under this restriction the misclassication
probabilities for subpopulation one are: jk(1) = 1 if j = k, jk(1) = 0 if j 6= k, for j = 1; :::; Q;
and k = 1; :::; Q.13 The misclassication parameters for the second and third subpopulations are
not restricted during estimation. Note that the subpopulation probabilities are estimated, so
although this specication restricts members of subpopulation 1 to always be correctly classied,
this is not a restrictive assumption because as (1) approaches zero the proportion of people who
are always correctly classied approaches zero.
This model of misclassication incorporates the key features of heterogeneous misclassica-
tion rates in a fairly parsimonious way. Some fraction of the population ((1)) is always correctly
classied, and the remaining two subpopulations are allowed to have completely di¤erent misclas-
sication rates, so that both the overall level of misclassication and the particular patterns in
misclassication are allowed to vary between subpopulations. Estimating the parameters of the
model reveals the extent of misclassication in occupations and the importance of person-specic
heterogeneity in misclassication rates.
The likelihood function presented in section 3.1 can be modied to account for person-specic
heterogeneity in misclassication. The observed choice probabilities presented are easily modied
13This version of the model already has 421 parameters that must be estimated, so in order to keep the model
tractable it was never estimated with more than three subpopulations.
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so that they are allowed to vary by subpopulation,
Pit(q; w
obs
it j ; ; y) =
QX
k=1
qk(y) bPit(k; wobsit j ; ); (23)
where y = 1; 2; 3 indexes subpopulations. Conditional on subpopulations, the likelihood function
is
L(jy) =
NY
i=1
Z T (i)Y
t=1
QX
q=1
1fOit = qgPit(q; wobsit j ; ; y)dF (; ) (24)
=
NY
i=1
Z
Li(j; ; y)dF (; ); (25)
The subpopulation that a particular person belongs to is not observed, so the likelihood function
must be integrated over the distribution of the type-specic misclassication rates. The distribu-
tion is discrete, so the integral is simply a probability weighted sum of the subpopulation-specic
likelihood contributions,
L() =
NY
i=1
3X
y=1
MX
m=1
(y)!mLi( jy; i = m; i = m) (26)
=
NY
i=1
Li() :
4 Parameter Estimates
This section presents the simulated maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the occupational
choice model. First, the parameters that reveal the extent of classication error in reported occu-
pations are discussed, and then the parameter estimates from the occupational choice model that
corrects for classication error and allows for person-specic heterogeneity in misclassication
are compared to the estimates from a model that does not correct for measurement error. Next,
the sensitivity of the estimates to measurement error in wages is examined. Finally, the model
is used to simulate data that is free from classication error in occupation codes.
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4.1 The Extent of Measurement Error in Occupation Codes
The estimates of the misclassication probabilities for subpopulations 2 and 3 along with the
estimated proportions of each type in the population are presented in Panels A and B of Table
3. The bottom row of panel A shows that correcting for classication error results in a large
improvement in the t of the model, since the likelihood function improves from  18; 695 when
classication error is ignored to  17; 821 when classication error is corrected for. The proba-
bility in row i, column j is the estimate of ij(y), which is the probability that occupation i is
observed in the data conditional on occupation j being the actual choice for a person in subpop-
ulation y. For example, the entry in the third column of the rst row indicates that condition of
being a member of subpopulation 2, there is a 2:6% chance that a person who is actually a sales
worker will be misclassied as a professional worker. The diagonal elements of the two panels of
Table 3 show the probabilities that occupational choices are correctly classied. Averaged across
all occupations, the probability that an occupational choice is correctly classied is .868 for sub-
population 2 and :840 for subpopulation 3. One striking feature of the estimated misclassication
probabilities is the large variation in misclassication rates across occupations. In subpopulation
2 the probability that an occupational choice is correctly classied ranges from a low of :56 for
sales workers to a high of :99 for craftsmen, while in subpopulation 3 the probability that an
occupational choice is correctly classied ranges from a low of :60 for sales workers to a high of
:98 for operatives.
The estimates of the probabilities that a person belongs to subpopulations 2 and 3 are 42%
and 19%, which leaves an estimated 38% of the population belonging to subpopulation 1, the
group whose occupational choices are never misclassied. The fact that a substantial fraction of
the population belongs to the subpopulation whose occupational choices are never misclassied
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highlights the importance of allowing for person-specic heterogeneity in misclassication rates.
The subpopulation-specic misclassication rates discussed in the previous paragraph must be
averaged over the three subpopulations to produce an estimate of the overall extent of misclas-
sication in the NLSY data. The estimates indicate that (:42 :86 + :19 :84 + :38 1 = 91%)
of one-digit occupational choices are correctly classied. This estimate of the overall extent of
misclassication in the NLSY data is lower than the misclassication rates reported in validation
studies based on other datasets. For example, Mellow and Sider (1983) nd an agreement rate of
81% at the one-digit level between employees reported occupations and employers occupational
descriptions in the January 1977 Current Population Survey (CPS). Mathiowetz (1992) nds a
76% agreement rate between the occupational descriptions given by workers of a single large
manufacturing rm and personnel records.
One possible explanation for the lower misclassication rate found in this study compared to
the validation studies is that the NLSY occupation data is of higher quality than both the CPS
data and the survey conducted by Mathiowetz (1992). It would be possible to test this hypothesis
by re-estimating the occupational choice model developed in this paper using the CPS data. This
extension is left for future research, since it appears that the procedures used by the CPS and
NLSY in constructing occupation codes are quite similar. Given these similarities, it is not clear
that one should expect the NLSY data to have a lower misclassication rate than the CPS. An
alternative explanation is that the employer reports of occupation codes that are assumed to be
completely free from classication error in validation studies are in fact measured with error.14
If this is true, then comparing noisy self reported data to noisy employer reported data would
cause validation studies to overstate the extent of classication error in occupation codes. The
14It is widely acknowledged that although validation studies are frequently based on the premise that one source
of data is completely free from error, in reality no source of data will be completely free from measurement error.
See Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for a discussion of this issue.
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idea that this type of validation study may result in an overstatement of classication error
in occupation or industry codes is not a new one. For example, Krueger and Summers (1988)
assume that the error rate for one-digit industry classications is half as large as the one reported
by Mellow and Sider (1983) as a rough correction for the overstatement of classication error in
validation studies.
The wide variation in misclassication rates across occupations along with the patterns in
misclassication show that certain types of jobs are likely to be misclassied in particular direc-
tions. Simpler models of misclassication that restrict the probability of misclassication to be
constant across occupations or impose symmetry in the misclassication rate matrix are clearly
inadequate. The estimates of the misclassication probabilities for subpopulation 2 show that
the sales occupation is the occupation that is most frequently misclassied. Conditional on a
person being employed as a sales worker, there is a 21% chance that in the data they will be
misclassied as a manager. The classication error matrix is highly asymmetric. Note that there
is only a 1.4% chance that a manager will be misclassied as a sales worker, but there is a 21%
chance that a sales worker will be misclassied as a manager. The high misclassication rate for
sales workers may be due in part to the existence of a three-digit occupation of sales managers,
which falls under the one-digit classication of managers.
The estimated misclassication probabilities for the blue collar occupations shown in panel
A of Table 3 show that these workers are most commonly misclassied into closely related low
skill occupations, although there are several exceptions. Reading down the laborers column of
panel A of Table 3 shows that laborers are frequently misclassied as service workers (22%), but
service workers are very unlikely to be misclassied as laborers (.39%). Service workers are most
frequently misclassied as professionals (6.4%) and sales workers (7.7%). The misclassication
rates between service and professional employment provide another example of asymmetry in
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the misclassication rate matrix, since professional workers are unlikely to be misclassied as
service workers (.18%), but service workers are frequently misclassied as professionals (6.4%).
The relatively large number of service workers misclassied as professionals may be caused by
health service workers such as health aides and nursing aides who are incorrectly coded as health
professionals. Ignoring this type of misclassication may result in serious biases in studies of wage
di¤erences between occupations, since professionals are one of the highest paid occupations, while
service workers are the lowest paid one-digit occupation.
The overall rate of misclassication rate for subpopulation 3 is approximately 3 percentage
points higher than the misclassication rate found in subpopulation 2, but the similarity of
the overall misclassication rates masks several large di¤erences between subpopulations in the
patterns of misclassication between occupations. For example, only 71% of service workers are
correctly classied in subpopulation 3, and these workers are largely misclassied as managers
(25%). In contrast, 82% of service workers are correctly classied in subpopulation two, and these
workers are relatively unlikely to be misclassied as managers (2%). Similarly, sales workers in
subpopulation two are frequently misclassied as managers (21%), but in subpopulation three
the corresponding misclassication rate is only 8%. Overall, these results show that there is
considerable heterogeneity in the patterns of misclassication across people in the NLSY. In
addition, the occupations of a sizeable fraction of the population (38%) are never misclassied.
The variation in misclassication rates across subpopulations suggests that a sizeable component
of the measurement error in occupation codes is due to errors or ambiguities in the occupational
descriptions provided by survey respondents, rather that due to errors introduced by coders as
they translate the job descriptions into occupation codes. If all misclassication in occupation
codes arises from mistakes made by coders, then one would not expect to nd evidence of person-
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specic heterogeneity in misclassication rates.15
4.2 Occupational Choice Model Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for the occupational choice model estimated with and without correcting
for classication error are presented in Table 6. In addition, this table presents the percent change
in each parameter from the model that corrects for classication error compared to the model
that ignores classication error. Let E represent the estimated parameter in the misclassication
model, and let B represent the same parameter in the baseline model that does not incorporate
classication error. The percent bias in absolute value resulting from ignoring classication error
and examining occupational choices using the model that does not correct for classication error
is
% abs dev =
jB   Ej
jEj
:
Before examining the e¤ects of classication error in occupations on individual parameters it is
useful to summarize the overall e¤ects of ignoring classication error on the parameter estimates
of the occupational choice model. The preceding section demonstrates that misclassication rates
are substantial, but the most important question to be addressed when examining measurement
error in occupation codes is the bias resulting from estimating models that do not take into
account misclassication. The average and median of the percent absolute deviations between
the baseline and misclassication models are presented in Table 4. The average parameter
in the occupational choice model is biased by 59.9% when the occupational choice model is
estimated without accounting for misclassication in occupation codes. The large average bias
is driven upwards by a number of large outliers, but the median bias is still substantial at 24.7%.
15In the NLSY, the occupation coders translated the occupational descriptions into census occupation codes
after each yearly survey was conducted, so there is little chance of coder-specic measurement error. In addition,
when coding the occupations for a given year each occupation coder did not have access to the occupational
descriptions provided by the respondent in previous interviews.
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These results indicate that ignoring classication error creates signicant bias in estimates of the
parameters of an occupational choice model. These ndings are consistent with the results of
Hausman et al. (1998), who nd that even small amounts of misclassication in the dependant
variable of a binary discrete choice model creates substantial bias in parameter estimates.
4.2.1 Wage Equation
While theoretical results regarding the e¤ects of measurement error in simple linear models have
been derived, there are no clear predictions for nonlinear models such as this occupational choice
model.16 One obvious problem created by the misclassication of occupations is that some wage
observations used to estimate occupation specic wage function are classied into the wrong
occupation. The patterns of misclassication present in the data will be a key determinant of
the magnitude and direction of the resulting bias. If workers are generally misclassied into
occupations with wage distributions similar to their actual occupation, one would expect the
bias to be less than if workers are frequently misclassied from low to high paying occupations.
The second problem created by misclassication is measurement error in occupation specic
experience variables that arises when reported occupations are used to create experience variables.
Again, it seems likely that the patterns in misclassication will be a key factor in determining the
severity of the bias resulting from measurement error in occupation specic experience variables.
Table 5 shows how the bias in wage equation parameters in each occupation varies with
misclassication rates by listing the probability of a worker being misclassied out of" or into"
each occupation along with the average and median percent deviations of the wage equation
parameters in the baseline model from those in the classication error model. For example,
the rst row of Table 5 shows that the probability of a worker being falsely classied as a
16See Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for a discussion of the e¤ects of measurement error in both linear
and nonlinear models.
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professional worker is :07, while the probability of a professional worker being misclassied into
another occupation is :06. The average bias caused by ignoring classication error for a parameter
in the professional wage equation is 110%, and the median bias is 59%. There is considerable
variation in the misclassication rates into (:04 to :22) and out of (:02 to :42) occupations as well
as in the median bias created by ignoring misclassication (14% to 59%). There is no obvious
relationship between the misclassication rates and the bias created by misclassication. This
result highlights the fact that the level of misclassication is not the sole determinant of how much
bias is created by misclassication, it is the level weighted by the importance of the misclassied
choices and observed wages. For example, the largest median bias is found in the professional
wage equation even though this occupation has among the lowest rates of misclassication.
The wage equation parameter estimates are presented in Panel A of Table 6. There are a
large number of wage equation parameters because there is a separate wage equation for each
occupation, so this section focuses on the e¤ects of ignoring classication error in occupation
codes on selected parameter estimates. The estimates of the wage equation in the professional
occupation show large changes in the estimated e¤ects of occupation specic work experience
on wages between the model that ignores classication error in occupations and the one that
accounts for classication error. For example, the e¤ect of a year of managerial experience
on wages in the professional occupation is biased downward by 42% from :064 to :037 when
misclassication is ignored. The model that ignores classication error overstates the e¤ect
of experience as a craftsman or operative on professional wages by 38% (:0280 to :0203) and
73% (:0447 to :0259). Accounting for classication error removes false transitions in the data
where craftsmen and operatives are observed switching to professional employment, and so the
e¤ects of craftsman and operative experience on professional wages are greatly reduced. The
substantial bias in estimates of the value of experience in other occupations on wages in the
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professional occupation is relevant for studies of wage growth over the career as well as studies of
occupational mobility because wage changes accompanying occupational switches partly reect
the transferability of skills across occupations. The bias in these particular parameters is also
interesting because the estimated misclassication probabilities show that professionals are rarely
misclassied as managers (21(2) = :0066; 21(3) = :0099), and managers are rarely misclassied
as professionals (12(2) = :0018; 12(3) = :0043). Similarly, the misclassication rates averaged
across subpopulations between the professional and operatives and craftsmen occupations are
below 1%. The low misclassication rates between these occupations combined with the large
bias in the experience coe¢ cients shows that even a small amount of misclassication can produce
large biases in estimates of the transferability of human capital across occupations.
Sales workers are the most frequently misclassied workers in both subpopulations 2 and 3.
Averaged across all three subpopulations, only 72% of sales workers are correctly classied. In
the most common subpopulation, sales workers are most likely to be misclassied as managers
(23(2) = :21), so one might expect signicant bias in estimates of the parameters of the man-
agerial and sales wage equations. The estimates show that ignoring classication error results in
a relatively small overestimate of the e¤ect of a year of sales experience on wages in the manage-
rial occupation (:0888 vs. :0879), while the value of experience as a manager in the managerial
occupation is overstated by 19%. Correcting for classication error also causes large changes in
estimates of the e¤ects of experience on wages in the sales occupation. The model that ignores
classication error indicates that a year of sales experience increases a sales workers wages by
17%, but this estimate falls by 13% to 15% once classication error is accounted for. The e¤ect
of clerical experience on a sales workers wages is overstated by 197% when classication error
is ignored, even though misclassication rates between the sales and clerical occupations are
low relative to the misclassication rate between sales and managerial employment. Ignoring
34
classication error leads to the misleading conclusion that clerical experience has a large and
statistically signicant e¤ect on wage in the sales occupation, but correcting for classication
error shows that clerical experience does not have a statistically signicant e¤ect on sales wages
at any conventional signicance level. Similarly, ignoring classication error leads to a 118%
overstatement in the value of professional experience in the sales occupation (.0672 vs. .0308).
The bias in these parameters is another example of large biases in estimates of the e¤ects of
human capital on wages resulting from ignoring classication error in occupations.
Further evidence of large changes in estimates of the transferability of human capital across
occupations are found in the remaining occupations. For example, there are several large changes
in the wage equation for craftsmen and operatives between the models with and without clas-
sication error. The model that does not correct for classication error implies that a year of
professional experience increases a craftsmans wages by 2:9%, and this e¤ect is statistically sig-
nicant at the 5% level: Once classication error is accounted for this e¤ect falls to 1:8% and
it is not statistically di¤erent from zero at the 5% level. This nding suggests that the type
of skills accumulated during employment as a professional have little or no value in craftsman
jobs. It appears that the false transitions created by classication error lead to an overstatement
of the transferability of human capital between the professional occupation and this seemingly
unrelated lower skill occupation. Even though misclassication leads to relatively few of these
false transitions, the bias is substantial.
The estimates of the service occupation wage function show that ignoring classication error
leads to a 178% overstatement of the value of clerical experience in the service occupation, and
a 307% overstatement of the value of operative experience in the service occupation. On the
other hand, the transferability of skills between the laborer and service occupations is vastly
understated when classication error is ignored (.0177 vs. .0674).
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The estimates of the wage equations show that misclassication creates substantial bias in
wage equation parameter estimates. The average wage equation parameter is biased by 59%,
while the median parameter is biased by 21%. The e¤ects of misclassication are quite compli-
cated, and parameters may be biased upwards or downward by measurement error. One of the
key insights derived from these estimates is that substantial bias is created by classication error
even in occupations where approximately 98% of choices are correctly classied. An important
implication of these results is that an analysis of human capital wage functions that does not take
into account classication error in occupations will lead in some cases to misleading conclusions
about the e¤ects of occupation specic human capital on wages. Given that misclassication
results in many false transitions between occupations, it seems reasonable that some of the most
seriously biased parameters are those that measure the transferability of human capital across
occupations.
The nal parameters of the wage equation are the standard deviations of the random shock
to wages in each occupation, eq, for q = 1; :::; 8. The estimates of these standard deviations
show that random uctuations in wages are overstated in six out of the eight occupations in
the model that ignores classication error. Ignoring classication error biases the estimate of
the standard deviation of the wage shock upwards by 36% for professionals, 48% for managers,
13% for craftsmen, 25% for operatives, and 16% for service workers. The intuition behind
the direction of this bias is that when classication error is ignored the model must provide
an explanation for the large number of short duration occupation switches that occur in the
data. One way the model can explain these transitions is through large wage shocks that create
short duration occupation switches. The model that allows for classication error provides an
alternative explanation which is that some occupation switches are created by classication error.
Once this alternative explanation is available, the variance of the wage shocks is reduced because
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classication error provides an explanation for some of the patterns in observed occupational
mobility and observed wages that is more consistent with the data than large wage shocks.
4.2.2 Non-pecuniary Utility Flows & Unobserved Heterogeneity
The occupational choice model presented in this paper allows occupational choices to depend on
non-pecuniary utility ows as well as wages. The importance of modelling occupational choices
in a utility maximizing framework rather than in an income maximizing framework is demon-
strated in work by Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Gould (2002). The parameter estimates for
the non-pecuniary utility ow equations for the models estimated with and without accounting
for classication error are presented in Panel B of Table 6. These results show that the average
parameter in the non-pecuniary utility ow equations is biased by 59% when classication error
is ignored, and the median parameter is biased by 30%. Ignoring classication error leads to sig-
nicant biases in estimates of the e¤ects of variables such as age, education, and work experience
on occupational choices.
The non-pecuniary utility ow parameters are all measured in log-wage units relative to the
base choice of service employment. For example, the estimate of the e¤ect of working as a
professional in the previous time period on the professional utility ow is 2:469 in the model that
ignores classication error. This means that a person who previously worked as a professional
receives utility that is 2:469 log wage units higher than a person who was previously employed as
a service worker but is currently employed as a professional. The e¤ect of previous professional
employment on the professional utility ow is biased downwards by 21% when classication error
is ignored. It appears that the false transitions between occupations created by classication error
lead to an understatement of the importance of state dependence in professional employment.
Overall, the estimates of the e¤ects of lagged occupational choices on current occupation specic
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utility ows are extremely sensitive to classication error. This result seems sensible since one
would expect estimates of the e¤ects of lagged choices to be quite sensitive to the false transitions
between occupations created by classication error.
Estimates of the e¤ects of occupation specic work experience on non-pecuniary utility are
also quite sensitive to classication error in occupation codes. For example, the e¤ect of experi-
ence as a manager on the non-pecuniary utility ow from being employed as a manager is biased
downward by 24% when classication error is ignored. Estimates of the e¤ects of experience in
other occupations on the operative utility ow are biased by even larger amounts. The e¤ect of
craftsman experience on operative utility is biased downward by 51%, and the e¤ect of laborer
experience on operative utility is biased downward by 82%. Ignoring classication error leads to
serious bias in estimates of the e¤ects of occupation-specic work experience on non-pecuniary
utility.
The estimates of the wage intercepts (s) and non-pecuniary intercepts (s) for the three
types of people in the model are presented in Panel C of Table 6. These parameter estimates
reveal the extent of unobserved heterogeneity in skills and preferences for employment in each
occupation. The estimates of the wage and non-pecuniary intercepts for the model that corrects
for classication error show that preferences for employment in each occupation vary widely
across types. For example, the professional non-pecuniary intercept ranges from  4:72 for a
type 1 person to  2:82 for a type 3 person, and the clerical non-pecuniary intercept ranges from
 1:79 to  :56 across types. These intercepts are measured relative to the value of employment
in the service occupation.
The nal section of Panel C of Table 6 shows the averages of the wage and non-pecuniary
intercepts across the three types of people for the models that correct for and ignore classication
error in occupation codes. The largest bias among these parameters occurs in parameters that
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measure preferences for employment in each occupations (s). The average preference for work-
ing as a craftsman changes from :048 in the model that ignores classication error to :23 in the
model that corrects for classication error, a change of 79%. The average preference for employ-
ment as operatives and laborers are each biased by approximately 60% when classication error
is ignored, while the average preference for employment as a sales worker is biased by 69%. The
large biases in estimates of preference parameters caused by ignoring classication error occurs
because unobserved heterogeneity in preferences helps explain occupational transitions that are
not well explained by the other parts of the model. When classication error is ignored and all
occupational transitions are treated as true occupation switches, the model attempts to explain
transitions that are not well explained by wages or the deterministic portion of non-pecuniary
utility ows in part through preference heterogeneity.
The bias in estimates of the average occupation-specic ability parameters (s) is much lower
than the bias in the preference parameters. The bias in the mean wage intercepts is lower than
14% across all occupations. The bias is extremely low in the clerical (3.8%) and laborer (.5%)
occupations. It appears that ignoring classication error causes the model to explain observed
patters in occupational mobility largely though unobserved heterogeneity in preferences rather
than heterogeneity in ability, which results in larger bias for parameters that measure preferences
compared to those that measure ability.
5 Simulating Data that is Free from Misclassication
One useful application of the model presented in this paper is that the estimated model can be
used to simulate occupational choice data that is free from classication error. Estimating the
parameters of the model amounts to estimating the distribution of true occupational choices con-
ditional on the choices and wages observed in the data, so it is fairly straightforward to simulate
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occupational choices by drawing from this distribution. The simulation algorithm outlined in
section 3.2.1 explains how the model can be used to simulate true occupational choices for each
person in the sample conditional on the observed choices, wages, and other explanatory variables
found in the data. The only minor complication is that each person must be randomly assigned
both a type (vectors of s and s) and a misclassication subpopulation before their occupa-
tional choices are simulated. Dene wi as a vector of person is observed wages over his entire
career: wi = fwit; t = 1; :::; T (i)g. Dene Xi, Zi; Expi; and Lastocci as the analogous vectors
of these explanatory variables over person is career, and let i = fXi; Zi; Expi; Lastoccig: The
conditional probability that a particular person is of type k and subpopulation (pop) j is
Pr(type = k; pop = jjOi; wi;i) = Pr(Oi; wijtype = k; pop = j;i) Pr(type = k; pop = j)
Pr(Oi; wiji)
=
Li(Oi; wijtype = k; pop = j;i)!kj
Li(Oi; wiji) :
Occupational choices are simulated by rst computing Pr(type = k; pop = jjOi; wi;i) for each
person in the sample, and then randomly assigning a type and subpopulation to each person
using these probabilities. Then, occupational choices are simulated conditional on the simulated
type and subpopulation using the algorithm outlined in section 3.2.1.
5.1 Simulated Occupational Choices
Table 2 presents occupational transition matrices for the actual data (top entry) and simulated
data (bottom entry) together to facilitate a comparison of the changes in the patterns of occupa-
tional mobility that result from correcting for classication error in occupations. The simulated
data is based on 2; 000 simulated careers. The diagonal elements of the matrix are larger in the
simulated data compared to the actual data. This indicates that the net e¤ect of misclassication
is to create false transitions between occupations that lead to an overstatement of occupational
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mobility. Eliminating the false transitions created by classication error leads to the largest
increase in the persistence of occupational choices for professional workers (74.7% to 78.5%) and
service workers (59.5% to 63.7%).
The fact that occupational choices become more persistent in the simulated data provides
information about the types of occupational choices that are likely to be agged as misclassied
by the misclassication model. One possible concern is that wage outliers may cause the model to
incorrectly ag occupational choices as misclassied because workers have (accurately measured)
wage outliers at certain points over their career. If this concern is valid, one would expect
occupational transitions to increase in the simulated data. However, the fact that the simulated
data shows more persistence in occupational choices than the noisy data provides evidence against
this concern, because overall the misclassication model is removing occupational transitions, not
creating new transitions.17
The increase in the persistence of occupational choices is of course accompanied by a cor-
responding decreases in occupational mobility. Some of the noteworthy decreases in mobility
occur between the sales and managerial occupations and the service and managerial occupations.
Classication error causes the data to overstate the mobility of sales workers into managerial em-
ployment by 62%, overstate the mobility of sales workers into clerical employment by 22%, and
overstate the mobility of clerical workers into professional employment by 18%. The simulated
data indicates that across all occupations, 9% of all occupational choices are misclassied.
5.1.1 Which Workers are Misclassied?
One explanatory variable that is of central importance when investigating occupational choices is
education. There is strong sorting across occupations based on completed education. Given this
17Section 5.1.2 presents evidence that the misclassication model also does not repeatedly ag individuals as
misclassied who have unusually high or low wages in their reported occupation.
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fact, it is useful to see how completed education levels vary between choices that are identied
as misclassied choices in the simulated data compared to choices that are identied as correctly
classied choices. This type of analysis provides information about the extent to which the model
uses variation in occupational choice probabilities with education levels to identify misclassied
occupations.
Table 7 shows the distribution of completed education for correctly classied and misclassied
occupational choices, disaggregated by occupation. For example, the table shows that 10.8% of
those workers who are correctly classied as professionals have not completed any years of college,
while 48.6% of workers who are misclassied as professionals have not completed any years of
college. A correctly classied professional has a 71.8% change of being a college graduate, while a
worker misclassied as a professional has only a 30.2% chance of being a college graduate. Clearly,
education serves as a strong predictor of which observations are likely to be true professionals as
opposed to observations that are falsely classied as professionals. When the model is used to
generate simulated occupational choices it tends to remove workers who have not completed any
college from the professional occupation. These results are consistent with the fact that the jobs
located in the professional occupation are overwhelmingly ones that require a college degree, or
at least some level of completed higher education. It is reassuring that the model tends to ag
workers as misclassied who appear to have reported education levels that are inconsistent with
their reported occupation.
Across the other occupations, similarly strong and sensible relationships exist between edu-
cation and misclassication. For example, in blue collar occupations, one would expect to see
the opposite relationship between misclassication and education from the one found in the pro-
fessional occupations, since college graduates are unlikely to work in low skill occupations. This
is in fact what the results in Table 7 show. For example, the percentage of correctly classied
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workers who have graduated from college is 2.1% for craftsmen, 2.5% for operatives, and 3.2% for
laborers. In contrast, for workers who are falsely classied in these occupations the percentage
of workers who are college graduates is 18.7% for craftsmen, 21.5% for operatives, and 11.7%
for laborers. In general, the workers who are misclassied into these blue collar occupations are
much more likely to be college graduates compared to workers who are correctly classied in
these occupations.
5.1.2 The Frequency of Misclassication Over an Individuals Career
Given the panel nature of the data, the simulated occupational choice data can be used to
examine how often occupational choices are misclassied over a typical individuals career. Table
8 presents the distribution of the total number of times that occupational choices are misclassied
over the course of a persons career. The nal column of Table 8 shows that across all three
subpopulations, 57.2% of people never have any of their occupational choices misclassied at any
point during their career. The relatively large number of people who are never misclassied is
made up of two groups. First, an estimated 39% of the population belongs to subpopulation
1 and therefore by denition never experience misclassication. Second, some members of the
other two subpopulations never experience misclassication because of the random nature of
misclassication. Reading down the nal column of Table 8 shows that the majority of workers
never experience misclassication (57.2%), 17.6% of workers are misclassied once over their
career, and 11.5% of workers are misclassied twice over their career. To provide some context
for these results, recall that the average worker contributes approximately 11 observations to the
data set.
One important feature of Table 8 is that it shows that it is very unlikely that a workers
occupational choices will be consistently misclassied over the course of his career. For example,
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only 4.3% of the sample is misclassied more than ve times over the course of the career. Another
notable feature of Table 8 is that the number of times that a person is misclassied is extremely
similar for subpopulations 2 and 3. This result is driven by the fact that the misclassication
rates averaged across occupations are quite close for the two subpopulations (.87 for subpop. 1
and .84 for subpop. 2). While subpopulations 2 and 3 experience substantial di¤erences in the
patterns of misclassication between occupations, the overall error rates are quite similar. More
detail about misclassication over the course of the career is presented in Table 8, which provides
information about the lengths of misclassication spells. Table 8 shows the distribution of the
number of times a person is consecutively misclassied, conditional on being misclassied. For
example, the rst entry in the nal column of Table 9 shows that conditional on an occupational
choice being misclassied, there is a 72.9% chance that the person will be correctly classied in
the next survey. Conditional on being misclassied, there is an 18.3% chance that a person will
be misclassied in two consecutive periods, and there is only a 5.2% chance that a person will
be misclassied in three consecutive periods.18
5.1.3 True Occupational Choices, Observed Choices, and Wages
The comparison of the occupational transition matrix observed in the data with the transition
matrix generated by the model highlights the overall changes in occupational mobility when
classication error in occupations is corrected for. Table 10 extends this analysis by showing
the average true occupational choice probabilities conditional on observed choices and observed
wages. This analysis shows how classication error rates vary with observed wages across oc-
cupations and provides a more detailed analysis of the type of occupational choice and wage
18One implication of the relatively short durations of misclassication spells is that the model does not tend to
repeatedly ag individuals as misclassied who have consistently high (or low) wages for their reported occupation
over the course of their entire career.
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combinations that are likely to be a¤ected by classication error.
Observed occupational choices are listed in the far left column of Table 10, while actual
occupational choices are listed in the top row. Conditional on the observed choice and wage (and
all of the other explanatory variables), the model is used to calculate the conditional probability
that the actual choice is each of the eight occupations for each occupational choice observed in the
data. The average of each probability for each occupation is presented in Table 10. Probabilities
are disaggregated by the percentile of the observed wage in the wage distribution of the observed
occupation to show how misclassication rates vary with observed wages. For example, the top
left cell of Table 10 shows that a worker observed in the data as a professional worker with a
wage in the top 10% of the professional wage distribution has a 90.9% chance of being correctly
classied as a professional worker. However, a worker observed as a professional with a wage
in the bottom 10% of the professional distribution has only a 75.7% chance of actually being a
professional worker. People observed in the data as low wage professional workers are primarily
service workers (9.5%).
Among workers observed in the data classied as managers, 85.8% of those in the middle 10%
of the managerial wage distribution are actually managers, 56.5% of the highest paid workers
are actually managers, while only 54.4% of those in the bottom 10% of the managerial wage
distribution are correctly classied. The vast majority of workers misclassied as managers are
actually sales workers. The wide variation in misclassication rates with observed wages lends
support to the use of wages to identify false occupational choices. Apparently, the variation in
the wage distribution across occupations provides enough information for the model to assign
true choice probabilities that vary substantially with observed wages. Combinations of choices
and wages that do not t the wage distribution are assigned high misclassication probabilities
by the model.
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Similar patterns of misclassication are found in the sales and clerical occupations, where
workers in certain areas of the wage distribution are more likely to be misclassied than those
in other areas of the wage distribution. For example, 91:6% of clerical workers in the top 10%
of the clerical wage distribution are correctly classied, but 3:9% of those observed as high wage
clerical workers are actually professionals. The simulated choices reveal that conditional on being
observed at the top of the clerical wage distribution there is a signicant chance that the worker is
actually a misclassied professional worker (3.9%). However, the unconditional probability that
a professional is misclassied as a clerical worker is much lower (41(2) = :013; 41(3) = :013), so
the simulations demonstrate that wages provide a substantial amount of information about which
occupational choices are misclassied. The di¤erence between the unconditional misclassication
probabilities and the misclassication probabilities that condition on wages highlights the value
of using wages to identify misclassied occupational choices.
There are some patterns present for workers observed as operatives that are worth discussing.
Conditional on being in the bottom 10% of the operative wage distribution there is an 86.9%
chance that the worker is correctly classied as an operative. The model suggests that the
majority of these low wages workers misclassied as operatives are actually sales workers (11.9%).
A similar pattern of misclassication is found for craftsmen, where the simulations indicate
that 12% of those observed as low wage craftsmen are actually sales workers. These patterns
of misclassication are somewhat surprising because the operatives and sales occupations are
composed of jobs that appear to be quite di¤erent overall. However, a closer look a the three-
digit occupations that make up the sales category shows that this occupation includes three-digit
occupations such as manufacturing industry sales" and construction sales". These jobs may
be the ones where respondentsdescriptions of their sales jobs could be mistaken for descriptions
of craftsman or operative employment.
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The fraction of service workers that are correctly classied is fairly stable across wage deciles,
ranging from :719   :732. The majority of workers misclassied as service workers are actually
employed in the closely related low skill occupation of laborers, but a number of those observed
as high wage service workers are actually professionals (5.4%). In addition, a sizeable fraction of
those observed as low wage professionals are actually service workers (9.5%). These patterns of
misclassication are somewhat surprising, since the unconditional probability that a professional
worker is misclassied as a service worker is quite low (81(2) = :0011; 81(3) = :0049), but
conditional on observed wages the probabilities are fairly large. One explanation for the rela-
tionship between observed wages and predicted misclassication is that there are certain high
paying professional jobs that are misclassied as closely related, but much lower paying service
occupations. For example, low wage health aides and nursing aids being falsely classied as high
wage health professionals.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Measurement Error in Wages
One important question regarding the model presented in this paper is the sensitivity of the
results to the existence of measurement error in wages. It is widely known that wages are
measured with error, so it is important to examine whether or not the existence of measurement
error in wages a¤ects the estimates of the extent of measurement error in occupation codes. One
way of addressing this question is to simulate noisy wage data, re-estimate the model using the
noisy wage data (leaving the rest of the NLSY data unchanged), and see how the estimates of
misclassication parameters change when the noisy wage data is used in place of the actual wages
found in the NLSY data. The noisy wages (wmeit ) are generated using the following equation,
wmeit = w
obs
it + it; where it  N(0; 2): (27)
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Recall that wobsit is a log wage, so the extent of measurement error in the noisy log wage data
is captured by 2 . A number of validation studies have quantied the extent of measurement
error in wages, see Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for a thorough survey of this literature.
Actual estimates of 2 do not exist for the NLSY, so in simulating the noisy data the measurement
error term is set towards the upper end of the reported estimates found in the literature based
on other data sources. The exact value used is 2 = :10: This value of 
2
 creates a substantial
amount of measurement error in the noisy wage data, since in the noisy data, measurement error
accounts for approximately one third of the total variation in log wages.
Rather that presenting a complete set of parameter estimates for the misclassication model
estimated using the noisy data, it is su¢ cient to summarize the overall e¤ect that the noisy
wage data has on the parameter estimates. The parameter estimates found in Table 3 and the
columns in Table 6 labelled "correct for classication error" serve as the baseline, since these
parameter estimates were obtained using the NLSY wage data. When the noisy wage data is used
in place of the NLSY wage data the average parameter in the model changes by approximately
2%, so it appears that the overall bias introduced by measurement error is relatively small.
The primary concern about measurement error in wages is that it may impact the estimates of
the extent of measurement error in occupation codes. The overall extent of misclassication is
summarized by the diagonal elements of the misclassication rate matrices for subpopulations
two and three, jj(y); j = 1; :::; Q; y = 2; 3. Recall that these parameters reect the probabilities
that occupational choices are correctly classied. Across both subpopulations, the use of noisy
wage data results in the average probability of correct classication ( 1
2Q
P
y=1;2
P
j=1;Q jj(y))
decreasing by only  :006 from :8546 to :8486. Adding measurement error slightly increases the
overall estimated rate of misclassication, but the magnitude of the increase is quite small. The
corresponding average absolute change in the probability of correct classication is only :008, so
48
it appears that estimates of the overall extent of misclassication in the NLSY occupation data
are quite robust to measurement error in wages.
Of course, it is possible for the overall level of misclassication to remain approximately
constant while the patterns in misclassication between occupations change substantially, so it is
necessary to check if the o¤diagonal elements of the misclassication matrices (jk(y); j 6= k) are
a¤ected by measurement error in wages. The average absolute change in these misclassication
rates is only :0015, so these o¤ diagonal elements are not greatly impacted by measurement error
in wages. The results of this simulation exercise show that even with a substantial amount of
measurement error in wages that accounts for 30% of total variation in wages, the estimates of
the misclassication parameters are extremely robust.
There are a number of reasons why the estimates of the misclassication parameters are robust
to a relatively large amount of measurement error in wages. The rst reason is that, as discussed
earlier in the paper, wages are not the only source of information that the model uses to infer that
an occupational choice is misclassied. For example, the panel nature of the data as well as the
strong relationship between observable variables (such as education) and occupational choices
provide a large amount of information about misclassication. Another key point is that many
of the occupational choices that are agged in the simulations as misclassications are associated
with extremely large wage changes. Wage changes of this magnitude are unlikely to be generated
in large numbers by measurement error in wages that is of the magnitude found in validation
studies. For example, the median wage for workers who are identied in the simulations as falsely
classied professionals is $5.59, while the median wage for workers who are correctly classied
as professionals is $10.32.
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6 Conclusion
Although occupational choices have been a topic of considerable research interest, existing re-
search has not studied occupational choices in a framework that addresses the biases created by
classication error in self-reported occupation data. This paper develops an approach to estimat-
ing a panel data occupational choice model that corrects for classication error in occupations
by incorporating a model of misclassication within an occupational choice model. Estimating
this model provides a solution to the problems created by measurement error in the discrete de-
pendant variable of an occupational choice model. Methodologically, this approach contributes
to the literature on misclassication in discrete dependant variables by demonstrating how sim-
ulation methods can be used to address the problems created in a panel data setting where
measurement error in a discrete dependant variable creates measurement error in explanatory
variables. The simulation technique is applicable to any discrete choice panel data model where
misclassication in a current period dependent variable creates measurement error in future ex-
planatory variables. This paper also contributes to the literature on misclassication by using
observed wages within the framework of an occupational choice model to obtain information
about misclassied occupational choices.
The main ndings of this paper are that a substantial number of occupational choices in the
NLSY are a¤ected by misclassication, with an overall misclassication rate of 9%. The results
also suggest that person-specic heterogeneity in misclassication rates is an important feature
of the data. An estimated 38% of the population never experiences a misclassied occupational
choice, and the remaining two subpopulations have substantially di¤erent propensities to have
their occupational choices misclassied in particular directions. The parameter estimates also
indicate that misclassication rates vary widely across occupations, and that the probability of a
worker being misclassied into each occupation is strongly inuenced by the workers actual oc-
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cupation. Most importantly, this paper demonstrates the large bias in parameter estimates that
results from estimating a model of occupational choices that ignores the fact that occupations are
frequently misclassied. Consistent with existing research in the area of misclassied dependant
variables, the results show that even relatively small amounts of misclassication create substan-
tial bias in parameter estimates. The median parameter is biased by 25% when classication
error in occupations is ignored, and the magnitude and direction of the bias varies widely across
parameters. Especially large biases are found in parameters that measure the transferability of
occupation specic work experience across occupations, since these parameters are quite sensi-
tive to the false occupational transitions created by classication error. Ignoring classication
error also creates signicant biases in estimates of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity
in preferences and random wage shocks in determining career choices.
Overall, the results indicate that one should use caution when interpreting the parameter
estimates from occupational choice models that are estimated without correcting for classication
error in self-reported occupations. In addition, these results suggest that similar bias may arise
when occupation dummy variables are used as explanatory variables, as is commonly done in a
wide range of studies. A possible avenue for future research would be to investigate the e¤ects of
classication error in occupation codes on parameter estimates in this wider class of models, such
as simple wage regressions, that make use of self-reported occupation data. Another interesting
avenue for future research would be to examine classication error in three-digit occupation codes
as opposed to the more broadly dened one-digit codes considered in this paper. However, the
extremely detailed nature of the three-digit occupation codes makes this a challenging problem
for future research.
51
Table 1a: Description of Occupations 
 
One-Digit Occupation Mean Wage Example Three-Digit Occupations 
Professional, technical & kindred 
workers $11.19 
Accountants, chemical engineers, physicians, 
social scientists 
Managers & administrators $12.89 Bank officers, office managers, school administrators 
Sales workers $9.05 Advertising salesmen, real estate agents, stock and bond salesmen, salesmen and sales clerks 
Clerical & unskilled workers $7.48 Bank tellers, cashiers, receptionists, secretaries 
Craftsmen & kindred workers $8.53 Carpenters, electricians, machinists, stonemasons, mechanics 
Operatives $7.20 Dry wall installers, butchers, drill press operatives, truck drivers 
Laborers $7.01 Garbage collectors, groundskeepers, freight handlers, vehicle washers 
Service workers $6.34 Janitors, child care workers, waiters, guards and watchmen 
Notes: Based on the U.S Census occupation codes found in the 1979 cohort of the NLSY. Wages 
in 1979 dollars. 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Age 27.09 2.24 
Education 14.26 .91 
North central .34 .47 
South .29 .45 
West .17 .37 
Number of observations 10,573  
Number of individuals 954  
Notes: Based on the U.S Census occupation codes found in the 1979 cohort of the NLSY. Wages 
in 1979 dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Occupational Transition Matrix – NLSY Data (top entry) and Simulated 
Data (bottom entry) 
 Professional Managers Sales Clerical Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service Total 
Professional  74.7 78.5 
6.9 
5.6 
2.3 
4.2 
4.5 
3.7 
5.0 
3.2 
3.0 
2.2 
1.3 
1.4 
2.2 
1.2 100 
Managers  6.4 6.6 
57.4 
58.5 
7.2 
9.4 
7.3 
7.4 
10.7 
10.3 
3.5 
2.9 
2.5 
2.6 
5.0 
2.3 100 
Sales  8.0 7.6 
14.9 
9.2 
53.5 
55.2 
7.7 
6.3 
5.4 
6.8 
5.2 
5.9 
2.2 
5.2 
3.2 
3.6 100 
Clerical  10.3 8.7 
12.4 
11.4 
5.9 
7.2 
44.8 
45.8 
6.8 
6.3 
7.0 
6.8 
8.3 
9.8 
4.6 
4.0 100 
Craftsmen  2.9 2.0 
5.3 
4.7 
1.0 
2.3 
2.2 
2.0 
66.6 
67.4 
11.1 
10.8 
8.1 
9.6 
2.6 
1.2 100 
Operatives 2.4 1.9 
2.2 
1.3 
2.1 
3.3 
3.1 
2.9 
18.4 
18.3 
56.8 
56.3 
10.1 
11.6 
4.9 
4.4 100 
Laborers 2.7 2.5 
3.3 
2.7 
1.8 
4.0 
7.9 
7.3 
23.2 
21.6 
18.6 
16.5 
36.2 
39.1 
6.1 
6.2 100 
Service  3.9 3.7 
7.8 
4.2 
1.5 
2.8 
3.5 
3.1 
8.4 
6.8 
6.8 
6.2 
8.6 
9.5 
59.5 
63.7 100 
Total 14.0 13.9 
11.5 
9.5 
5.3 
7.9 
7.6 
7.3 
25.8 
25.2 
16.9 
16.2 
9.6 
11.5 
9.4 
8.4 100 
Entries are the percentage of employment spells starting in the occupation listed in the left 
column that end in the occupation listed in the top row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3, Panel A: Parameter Estimates- Misclassification Probabilities for Subpopulation 2 
(αjk(2)) 
Observed/Actual Professional Managers Sales Clerical Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service 
Professional  .9570 (.0023) 
.0018 
(.0096) 
.0264 
(.0025) 
.0017 
(.0074) 
.0033 
(.0002) 
.0007 
(.0004) 
.0380 
(.0004) 
.0641 
(.0017) 
Managers  .0066 (.0041) 
.9762 
(.0042) 
.2128 
(.0026) 
.0052 
(.0082) 
.0013 
(.0002) 
.0021 
(.0015) 
.0011 
(.0022) 
.0238 
(.0003) 
Sales  .0036 (.0016) 
.0148 
(.0046) 
.5578 
(.0001) 
.0133 
(.0045) 
.0000 
(.0015) 
.0029 
(.0017) 
.0019 
(.0040) 
.0774 
(.0009) 
Clerical  .0131 (.0002) 
.0031 
(.0101) 
.0131 
(.0055) 
.9579 
(.0046) 
.0002 
(.0016) 
.0021 
(.0022) 
.0046 
(.0067) 
.0042 
(.0033) 
Craftsmen  .0055 (.0023) 
.0022 
 (.0045) 
.1063 
(.0098) 
.0052 
(.0025) 
.9897 
(.0054) 
.0055 
(.0030) 
.0204 
(.0121) 
.0024 
(.0023) 
Operatives .0121 (.0025) 
.0000 
(.0064) 
.0456 
(.0005) 
.0013 
(.0082) 
.0000 
(.0039) 
.9849 
(.0058) 
.0063 
(.0009) 
.0004 
(.0223) 
Laborers .0000 (.0003) 
.0000  
(.0131) 
.0164 
(.0043) 
.0136 
(.0085) 
.0054 
(.0021) 
.0016 
(.0082) 
.7029 
(.0014) 
.0039 
(.0079) 
Service  .0018 (.0002) 
.0018 
(.0043) 
.0213 
(.0008) 
.0014 
(.0086) 
.0000 
(.0018) 
.0000 
(.0022) 
.2243 
(.0012) 
.8235 
(.0068) 
Pr(subpopulation 2) .4243 (.0211)        
 Ignore misclassification 
Correct for 
misclassification       
Log-likelihood -18,695 -17,821       
Notes: Element α(i,j) of this table, where i refers to the row and j refers to the column is the probability that occupation i is 
observed, conditional on j being the true choice: α(j,k)=Pr(occupation j observed | occupation k is true choice). Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 3, Panel B : Misclassification Probabilities for Subpopulation 3 (αij(3)) 
Observed/Actual Professional Managers Sales Clerical Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service 
Professional  .9289  (.0022) 
.0043 
 (.0097) 
 .0394 
(.0024) 
 .0012 
(.0079) 
.0357 
(.0005) 
.0007 
(.0003) 
.0104 
 (.0003) 
.0190 
(.0016) 
Managers  .0099  (.0040) 
.9641 
 (.004) 
 .0822 
(.0027) 
.0032 
 (.0081) 
 .0046 
(.0003) 
 .0030 
(.0016) 
.0041 
 (.0021) 
.2548 
 (.0002) 
Sales  .0096  (.0016) 
 .0248 
(.0056) 
 .6007 
(.0001) 
.0125 
(.0046) 
.0002 
(.0016) 
.0003 
 (.0018) 
 .0022 
(.0041) 
.0026 
 (.0008) 
Clerical  .0126  (.0001) 
.0027 
 (.0103) 
 .0052 
(.0054) 
 .9634 
(.0045) 
 .0004 
(.0011) 
.0012 
 (.0023) 
.0031 
 (.0061) 
.0006 
 (.0037) 
Craftsmen  .0234  (.0024) 
.0025 
 (.0043) 
 .0904 
(.0096) 
.0068 
(.0024) 
.9475 
(.0061) 
.0067 
 (.0031) 
.0504 
 (.0130) 
 .0041 
(.0026) 
Operatives .0106  (.0026) 
.0007 
(.0065) 
 .1335 
(.0005) 
 .0029 
(.0081) 
 .00000 
 (.0047) 
.9833 
 (.0051) 
 .0054 
(.0008) 
.0000 
(.0001) 
Laborers .0000  (.0001) 
 .0000 
(.0141) 
 .0307 
(.0041) 
.0082 
(.0084) 
.0114  
(.0020) 
.0040 
 (.0084) 
.6215 
 (.0005) 
 .0042 
(.0069) 
Service  .0049  (.0002) 
.0008 
  (.0043) 
 .0176 
(.0009) 
 .0016 
(.0088) 
.0000 
(.0017) 
.0006 
 (.0024) 
.3028 
 (.0008) 
.7139 
 (.0048) 
Pr(subpopulation 3 .1937 (.0235)        
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of Bias Caused by Ignoring Classification Error 
 Average % deviation Median % deviation 
Wage equation 59.4 20.6% 
Non-pecuniary utility flow equation 59.2 29.6% 
All parameters 59.9 24.7% 
Notes: Entries are the percent absolute deviations of parameters in the baseline model from the 
model that corrects for misclassification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Misclassification Rates by Occupation and Bias in Wage Equations from 
Ignoring Misclassification 
Occupation Misclassified into 
Misclassified 
out of 
Average % 
deviation 
Median % 
deviation 
        Professional  .07 .06 110% 59% 
        Managers  .20 .02 27% 14% 
        Sales  .14 .42 27% 14% 
        Clerical  .06 .02 47% 18% 
        Craftsmen  .04 .02 11% 10% 
        Operatives .05 .01 25% 14% 
        Laborers .04 .20 113% 30% 
        Service  .22 .14 70% 26% 
Notes: “Misclassified into” refers to Pr(observed in listed occupation ∩ actually work in another 
occupation). Misclassified out of refers to Pr(actually work in listed occupation  ∩ observed in 
another occupation). Entries in the rightmost two columns are the percent absolute deviations of 
parameters in the baseline model from the model that corrects for misclassification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Wage Equation 
 
Wage 
equation 
Professional  % absolute 
deviation 
Managers  % absolute 
deviation 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.0233 (0.0154) 
0.0079 
(0.0073) 1.9644 
0.0474 
(0.0184) 
0.0351 
(0.0091) 0.3504 
Age2/100 -0.2280 (0.0985) 
-0.1434 
(0.0426) 0.5904 
-0.4028 
(0.1230) 
-0.3543 
(0.0630) 0.1368 
Education 0.0734 (0.0057) 
0.0626 
(0.0041) 0.1725 
0.0825 
(0.0082) 
0.0837 
(0.0060) 0.0143 
Professional 
experience 
0.0715 
(0.0053) 
0.0687 
(0.0034) 0.0408 
0.0944 
(0.0130) 
0.0896 
(0.0086) 0.0536 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0375 
(0.0158) 
0.0644 
(0.0123) 0.4177 
0.0656 
(0.0071) 
0.0547 
(0.0055) 0.1993 
Sales 
experience 
0.0493 
(0.0147) 
0.0499 
(0.0101) 0.0120 
0.0888 
(0.0135) 
0.0879 
(0.0097) 0.0102 
Clerical 
experience 
0.0430 
(0.0191) 
0.0377 
(0.0162) 0.1406 
0.0191 
(0.0096) 
0.0209 
(0.0073) 0.0861 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.0280 
(0.0092) 
0.0203 
(0.0100) 0.3793 
0.0488 
(0.0074) 
0.0556 
(0.0062) 0.1223 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0447 
(0.0236) 
0.0259 
(0.0210) 0.7259 
0.0634 
(0.0124) 
0.0705 
(0.0121) 0.1007 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0146 
(0.0291) 
-0.0083 
(0.0232) 2.7676 
0.0416 
(0.0268) 
0.0233 
(0.0179) 0.7854 
Service 
experience 
0.0000 
(0.0224) 
0.0718 
(0.0234) 1.0005 
0.0100 
(0.0140) 
0.0069 
(0.0117) 0.4504 
North central -0.0635 (0.0262) 
-0.0139 
(0.0189) 3.5683 
-0.1063 
(0.0302) 
-0.0667 
(0.0233) 0.5935 
South -0.0448 (0.0245) 
0.0222 
(0.0182) 3.0180 
-0.0726 
(0.0345) 
-0.0849 
(0.0284) 0.1449 
West 0.0412 (0.0294) 
0.1046 
(0.0205) 0.6061 
-0.0919 
(0.0438) 
-0.0531 
(0.0311) 0.7307 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Wage Equations 
 
Wage 
equation 
Sales  % absolute 
deviation 
Clerical  % absolute 
deviation 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.0662 (0.0368) 
0.1354 
(0.0272) 0.5110 
0.0480 
(0.0153) 
0.0413 
(0.0157) 0.1622 
Age2/100 -1.0006 (0.2662) 
-1.0984 
(0.1886) 0.0890 
-0.4330 
(0.1057) 
-0.3588 
(0.1095) 0.2069 
Education 0.1837 (0.0189) 
0.1593 
(0.0268) 0.1528 
0.0528 
(0.0087) 
0.0511 
(0.0081) 0.0333 
Professional 
experience 
0.0672 
(0.0366) 
0.0308 
(0.0542) 1.1818 
0.0957 
(0.0146) 
0.1051 
(0.0230) 0.0899 
Managerial 
experience 
0.1316 
(0.0274) 
0.1089 
(0.0322) 0.2086 
0.0454 
(0.0104) 
0.0418 
(0.0121) 0.0861 
Sales 
experience 
0.1774 
(0.0163) 
0.1571 
(0.0195) 0.1296 
0.0806 
(0.0162) 
0.0888 
(0.0203) 0.0923 
Clerical 
experience 
0.1281 
(0.0333) 
0.0430 
(0.0433) 1.9799 
0.0562 
(0.0085) 
0.0572 
(0.0093) 0.0175 
Craftsmen 
experience 
-0.0183 
(0.0258) 
-0.0453 
(0.0297) 0.5960 
0.0502 
(0.0083) 
0.0646 
(0.0119) 0.2229 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0845 
(0.0284) 
0.0845 
(0.0297) 0.0000 
0.0516 
(0.0118) 
0.0500 
(0.0125) 0.0320 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0507 
(0.0431) 
0.0521 
(0.0552) 0.0269 
0.0420 
(0.0167) 
0.0345 
(0.0153) 0.2174 
Service 
experience 
0.0241 
(0.0295) 
-0.0657 
(0.0826) 1.3668 
0.0191 
(0.0177) 
0.0215 
(0.0183) 0.1116 
North central -0.2505 (0.0754) 
-0.3711 
(0.1051) 0.3250 
-0.1688 
(0.0311) 
-0.1965 
(0.0369) 0.1409 
South 0.1225 (0.0764) 
0.1249 
(0.0915) 0.0195 
-0.0847 
(0.0307) 
-0.1030 
(0.0377) 0.1774 
West 0.0979 (0.0945) 
0.1015 
(0.1070) 0.0358 
-0.0228 
(0.0342) 
-0.0230 
(0.0362) 0.0087 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Wage Equations 
 
Wage 
equation 
Craftsmen  % absolute 
deviation 
Operatives  % absolute 
deviation 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.0606 (0.0068) 
0.0489 
(0.0053) 0.2393 
0.0128 
(0.0085) 
0.0123 
(0.0073) 0.0407 
Age2/100 -0.5257 (0.0481) 
-0.4576 
(0.0398) 0.1490 
-0.2230 
(0.0642) 
-0.2605 
(0.0604) 0.1436 
Education 0.0290 (0.0048) 
0.0254 
(0.0045) 0.1417 
0.0209 
(0.0054) 
0.0079 
(0.0048) 1.6523 
Professional 
experience 
0.0290 
(0.0120) 
0.0188 
(0.0210) 0.5426 
0.0670 
(0.0229) 
0.0751 
(0.0344) 0.1079 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0558 
(0.0115) 
0.0646 
(0.0113) 0.1362 
0.0432 
(0.0157) 
0.0552 
(0.0152) 0.2174 
Sales 
experience 
0.0100 
(0.0169) 
0.0438 
(0.0183) 0.7717 
0.0200 
(0.0149) 
0.0157 
(0.0176) 0.2739 
Clerical 
experience 
0.0381 
(0.0125) 
0.0366 
(0.0210) 0.0410 
0.0499 
(0.0110) 
0.0370 
(0.0191) 0.3486 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.0591 
(0.0028) 
0.0605 
(0.0027) 0.0231 
0.0607 
(0.0067) 
0.0764 
(0.0062) 0.2055 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0386 
(0.0052) 
0.0352 
(0.0048) 0.0966 
0.0549 
(0.0045) 
0.0470 
(0.0041) 0.1681 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0217 
(0.0069) 
0.0114 
(0.0066) 0.9035 
0.0708 
(0.0090) 
0.0512 
(0.0077) 0.3828 
Service 
experience 
0.0254 
(0.0094) 
0.0361 
(0.0106) 0.2964 
-0.0023 
(0.0149) 
0.0285 
(0.0147) 1.0811 
North central -0.1034 (0.0197) 
-0.1201 
(0.0185) 0.1392 
-0.0637 
(0.0266) 
-0.0948 
(0.0222) 0.3281 
South -0.0786 (0.0209) 
-0.0828 
(0.0182) 0.0507 
0.0234 
(0.0270) 
0.0026 
(0.0222) 7.8973 
West 0.0847 (0.0210) 
0.0868 
(0.0208) 0.0242 
0.0086 
(0.0307) 
-0.0043 
(0.0268) 2.9908 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Wage Equations 
 
Wage 
equation 
Laborers  % 
absolute 
deviation 
Service  % 
absolute 
deviation 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.0268 (0.0119) 
0.0235 
(0.0119) 0.1404 
-0.0083 
(0.0120) 
-0.0116 
(0.0093) 0.2819 
Age2/100 -0.3202 (0.0994) 
-0.3339 
(0.0961) 0.0410 
0.0234 
(0.0889) 
0.0314 
(0.0666) 0.2548 
Education 0.0331 (0.0087) 
0.0184 
(0.0077) 0.7989 
0.0965 
(0.0071) 
0.0864 
(0.0070) 0.1169 
Professional 
experience 
0.0715 
(0.0515) 
0.0295 
(0.0905) 1.4237 
0.0285 
(0.0359) 
0.02738 
(0.0258) 0.0409 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0457 
(0.0232) 
0.0597 
(0.0478) 0.2345 
0.0294 
(0.0151) 
0.0419 
(0.0316) 0.2983 
Sales 
experience 
-0.0165 
(0.0633) 
0.0364 
(0.0378) 1.4533 
0.0132 
(0.0178) 
-0.0121 
(0.0414) 2.0909 
Clerical 
experience 
0.0445 
(0.0234) 
0.0401 
(0.0247) 0.1097 
0.0240 
(0.0185) 
0.0086 
(0.0391) 1.7810 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.0559 
(0.0082) 
0.0683 
(0.0088) 0.1816 
0.0681 
(0.0103) 
0.0167 
(0.0362) 3.0778 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0525 
(0.0083) 
0.0584 
(0.0088) 0.1010 
0.0304 
(0.0179) 
-0.0382 
(0.0199) 1.7958 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0504 
(0.0085) 
0.0556 
(0.0083) 0.0935 
0.0177 
(0.0219) 
0.0674 
(0.0341) 0.7374 
Service 
experience 
0.0040 
(0.0158) 
0.0009 
(0.0195) 3.4222 
0.0562 
(0.0066) 
0.0542 
(0.0062) 0.0369 
North central -0.0866 (0.0393) 
-0.0675 
(0.0363) 0.2830 
-0.2492 
(0.0291) 
-0.2297 
(0.0239) 0.0847 
South -0.1109 (0.0408) 
-0.0859 
(0.0376) 0.2915 
-0.1181 
(0.0304) 
-0.0865 
(0.0315) 0.3649 
West -0.0043 (0.0492) 
0.0235 
(0.0524) 1.1843 
-0.1278 
(0.0290) 
-0.1273 
(0.0307) 0.0037 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel A: Parameter Estimates – Error Standard Deviations 
Occupation    
 Ignore classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification error 
% absolute 
deviation 
Professional  0.3249 (0.0055) 
0.2394 
(0.0069) 0.3575 
Managers  0.3701 (0.0080) 
0.2493 
(0.0163) 0.4847 
Sales  0.5724 (0.0217) 
0.6850 
(0.0248) 0.1643 
Clerical  0.2763 (0.0136) 
0.2636 
(0.0211) 0.0485 
Craftsmen  0.3039 (0.0051) 
0.2683 
(0.0068) 0.1325 
Operatives 0.3317 (0.0063) 
0.2643 
(0.0105) 0.2547 
Laborers 0.3364 (0.0109) 
0.3411 
(0.0122) 0.0137 
Service  0.3250 (0.0090) 
0.2802 
(0.0154) 0.1597 
      Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel B: Parameter Estimates – Non-pecuniary Utility 
 
 Professionals  % absolute 
deviation 
Managers  % absolute 
deviation 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age 0.1203 (0.0799) 
0.0973 
(0.0305) 0.2368 
-0.0409 
(0.0809) 
-0.1448 
(0.0551) 0.7176 
Age2/100 -0.2295 (0.6142) 
-0.0345 
(0.0000) 5.6531 
0.4907 
(0.5784) 
1.0633 
(0.4094) 0.5385 
Education 0.4260 (0.0543) 
0.4715 
(0.0370) 0.0967 
0.2145 
(0.0570) 
0.2631 
(0.0240) 0.1848 
High school 
diploma 
-0.6393 
(0.2354) 
-0.3529 
(0.2103) 0.8118 
-0.2384 
(0.2213) 
-0.3125 
(0.2106) 0.2371 
College 
diploma 
0.0984 
(0.1881) 
0.3509 
(0.2144) 0.7196 
0.2867 
(0.2013) 
0.5197 
(0.2353) 0.4484 
Professional 
experience 
0.4819 
(0.1484) 
0.4894 
(0.1162) 0.0152 
0.3134 
(0.1468) 
0.3707 
(0.1250) 0.1545 
Managerial 
experience 
-0.0761 
(0.0830) 
-0.0229 
(0.1472) 2.3231 
0.2605 
(0.0688) 
0.3433 
(0.1308) 0.2412 
Sales 
experience 
-0.1569 
(0.1171) 
-0.1803 
(0.1604) 0.1296 
0.0811 
(0.1009) 
0.1052 
(0.1430) 0.2293 
Clerical 
experience 
-0.1028 
(0.1126) 
-0.0184 
(0.1637) 4.5877 
0.1471 
(0.0860) 
0.2410 
(0.1249) 0.3897 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.1531 
(0.0657) 
0.2813 
(0.1271) 0.4556 
0.2197 
(0.0579) 
0.3523 
(0.1224) 0.3763 
Operatives 
experience 
-0.1836 
(0.0874) 
-0.1056 
(0.1784) 0.7378 
0.0218 
(0.0608) 
0.1383 
(0.1102) 0.8424 
Laborer 
experience 
-0.0459 
(0.1420) 
0.1008 
(0.2052) 1.4554 
-0.0207 
(0.1182) 
0.2366 
(0.1849) 1.0875 
Service 
experience 
-0.4737 
(0.0645) 
-0.8955 
(0.1467) 0.4710 
-0.2765 
(0.0574) 
-0.2843 
(0.0820) 0.0275 
Previously a 
professional 
2.469 
(0.339) 
3.108 
(0.368) 0.2056 
1.237 
(0.379) 
2.022 
(0.484) 0.3880 
Previously a 
manager 
0.792 
(0.340) 
1.181 
(0.665) 0.3295 
2.780 
(0.261) 
3.717 
(0.636) 0.2522 
Previously 
sales 
1.194 
(0.459) 
0.893 
(0.594) 0.3376 
1.703 
(0.432) 
1.623 
(0.591) 0.0492 
Previously 
clerical 
1.628 
(0.354) 
1.546 
(0.364) 0.0529 
1.853 
(0.322) 
2.198 
(0.287) 0.1569 
Previously a 
craftsman 
1.042 
(0.298) 
1.064 
(0.485) 0.0215 
1.673 
(0.294) 
2.482 
(0.472) 0.3260 
Previously an 
operative 
0.752 
(0.305) 
0.537 
(0.488) 0.4004 
0.400 
(0.320) 
0.493 
(0.516) 0.1886 
Previously a 
laborer 
0.634 
(0.346) 
0.341 
(0.509) 0.8592 
0.839 
(0.333) 
0.931 
(0.471) 0.0988 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel B: Parameter Estimates – Non-pecuniary Utility 
 
 Sales  % absolute 
deviation 
Clerical  % absolute 
deviation 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age -0.1327 (0.1137) 
-0.3511 
(0.0484) 0.6221 
-0.1327 
(0.1137) 
-0.3511 
(0.0484) 0.3674 
Age2/100 1.3350 (0.8122) 
2.8694 
(0.4692) 0.5347 
1.3350 
(0.8122) 
2.8694 
(0.4692) 0.3844 
Education 0.1403 (0.0764) 
0.1338 
(0.0563) 0.0486 
0.1403 
(0.0764) 
0.1338 
(0.0563) 0.1520 
High school 
diploma 
-0.0762 
(0.3236) 
-0.3263 
(0.2981) 0.7665 
-0.0762 
(0.3236) 
-0.3263 
(0.2981) 0.1192 
College 
diploma 
0.6676 
(0.2308) 
0.9465 
(0.2761) 0.2946 
0.6676 
(0.2308) 
0.9465 
(0.2761) 0.3700 
Professional 
experience 
0.0865 
(0.1731) 
0.0444 
(0.1797) 0.9482 
0.0865 
(0.1731) 
0.0444 
(0.1797) 0.0536 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0223 
(0.0903) 
0.0827 
(0.1555) 0.7304 
0.0223 
(0.0903) 
0.0827 
(0.1555) 0.7303 
Sales 
experience 
0.1072 
(0.1016) 
0.0814 
(0.1502) 0.3171 
0.1072 
(0.1016) 
0.0814 
(0.1502) 0.3171 
Clerical 
experience 
-0.0090 
(0.1083) 
0.0779 
(0.1501) 1.1155 
-0.0090 
(0.1083) 
0.0779 
(0.1501) 0.1556 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.1471 
(0.0948) 
0.3264 
(0.1370) 0.5495 
0.1471 
(0.0948) 
0.3264 
(0.1370) 0.4309 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0325 
(0.0869) 
0.1358 
(0.1214) 0.7607 
0.0325 
(0.0869) 
0.1358 
(0.1214) 0.6347 
Laborer 
experience 
-0.0951 
(0.1618) 
0.0596 
(0.1700) 2.5956 
-0.0951 
(0.1618) 
0.0596 
(0.1700) 0.9400 
Service 
experience 
-0.3775 
(0.0972) 
-0.4288 
(0.1928) 0.1198 
-0.3775 
(0.0972) 
-0.4288 
(0.1928) 0.0543 
Previously a 
professional 
1.312 
(0.476) 
1.934 
(0.599) 0.3216 
1.312 
(0.476) 
0.1.934 
(0.0599) 0.2832 
Previously a 
manager 
1.837 
(0.393) 
2.194 
(0.735) 0.1629 
1.837 
(0.393) 
2.194 
(0.735) 0.2739 
Previously 
sales 
3.262 
(0.411) 
2.869 
(0.544) 0.1372 
3.262 
(0.411) 
2.869 
(0.544) 0.2087 
Previously 
clerical 
2.005 
(0.388) 
1.864 
(0.0427) 0.0755 
2.005 
(0.388) 
1.864 
(0.427) 0.0245 
Previously a 
craftsman 
1.358 
(0.407) 
1.778 
(0.573) 0.2361 
1.358 
(0.407) 
1.778 
(0.573) 0.2439 
Previously an 
operative 
1.272 
(0.361) 
1.049 
(0.457) 0.2122 
1.272 
(0.361) 
1.049 
(0.457) 0.2529 
Previously a 
laborer 
1.358 
(0.457) 
1.015 
(0.545) 0.3369 
1.358 
(0.457) 
1.015 
(0.545) 0.1852 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel B: Parameter Estimates – Non-pecuniary Utility 
 
 Craftsmen  % absolute 
deviation 
Operatives  % absolute 
deviation 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age -0.1896 (0.0717) 
-0.2998 
(0.0799) 0.4007 
-0.1519 
(0.0551) 
-0.2535 
(0.0558) 0.3115 
Age2/100 1.1693 (0.5598) 
1.8996 
(0.6139) 0.3291 
1.3557 
(0.4459) 
2.0207 
(0.4634) 0.2851 
Education 0.1443 (0.0638) 
0.1253 
(0.0678) 0.1947 
-0.0703 
(0.0479) 
-0.0873 
(0.0422) 0.1682 
High school 
diploma 
0.2760 
(0.2437) 
0.2466 
(0.1995) 0.0148 
0.1959 
(0.1839) 
0.1931 
(0.1680) 0.0537 
College 
diploma 
0.5009 
(0.2163) 
0.7951 
(0.2838) 0.1359 
-0.4700 
(0.2633) 
-0.4137 
(0.3614) 20.7143 
Professional 
experience 
0.1874 
(0.1529) 
0.1779 
(0.1211) 0.0530 
0.1858 
(0.1581) 
0.1962 
(0.1387) 1.4746 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0188 
(0.0762) 
0.0697 
(0.1283) 0.6004 
-0.1568 
(0.0753) 
-0.0980 
(0.1321) 0.0020 
Sales 
experience 
-0.1264 
(0.1093) 
-0.1851 
(0.1752) 0.2889 
-0.2418 
(0.1272) 
-0.3401 
(0.1816) 0.1798 
Clerical 
experience 
0.3591 
(0.0857) 
0.4253 
(0.1258) 0.3213 
-0.1887 
(0.0887) 
-0.1428 
(0.1439) 0.7116 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.1197 
(0.0637) 
0.2104 
(0.1293) 0.2471 
0.3067 
(0.0520) 
0.4074 
(0.1172) 0.5117 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0786 
(0.0707) 
0.2151 
(0.1136) 0.6869 
0.0571 
(0.0552) 
0.1824 
(0.1010) 0.3475 
Laborer 
experience 
0.0089 
(0.1066) 
0.1485 
(0.1601) 0.8194 
0.0430 
(0.0848) 
0.2381 
(0.1449) 0.8217 
Service 
experience 
-0.3782 
(0.0623) 
-0.3587 
(0.0787) 0.0990 
-0.4665 
(0.0448) 
-0.5178 
(0.0697) 0.0722 
Previously a 
professional 
1.338 
(0.380) 
1.866 
(0.478) 0.1591 
0.1124 
(0.0394) 
1.337 
(0.526) 0.2965 
Previously a 
manager 
1.477 
(0.325) 
2.034 
(0.653) 0.2778 
0.1527 
(0.0312) 
2.115 
(0.651) 0.3681 
Previously 
sales 
1.710 
(0.457) 
1.415 
(0.618) 0.3348 
0.1413 
(0.0489) 
1.059 
(0.536) 0.3292 
Previously 
clerical 
2.804 
(0.301) 
2.874 
(0.097) 0.0275 
0.1198 
(0.0333) 
1.166 
(0.324) 0.0207 
Previously a 
craftsman 
1.105 
(0.307) 
1.462 
(0.492) 0.1381 
0.2903 
(0.0195) 
3.368 
(0.368) 0.1756 
Previously an 
operative 
0.763 
(0.280) 
0.609 
(0.416) 0.0752 
0.1521 
(0.0195) 
1.415 
(0.294) 0.0477 
Previously a 
laborer 
1.672 
(0.286) 
1.411 
(0.399) 0.2470 
0.1636 
(0.0231) 
1.312 
(0.329) 0.2746 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel B: Parameter Estimates – Non-pecuniary Utility 
 
 Laborers  % absolute 
deviation 
 Ignore 
classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification 
error 
 
Age -0.2017 (0.0634) 
-0.3403 
(0.0650) 0.4072 
Age2/100 1.8105 (0.5104) 
2.7642 
(0.5240) 0.3450 
Education -0.1514 (0.0613) 
-0.1099 
(0.0545) 0.3774 
High school 
diploma 
0.2912 
(0.2274) 
0.1422 
(0.2124) 1.0480 
College 
diploma 
0.0821 
(0.3341) 
0.3030 
(0.3584) 0.7291 
Professional 
experience 
-0.4791 
(0.2656) 
-0.3477 
(0.4226) 0.3778 
Managerial 
experience 
-0.2364 
(0.1162) 
-0.3256 
(0.1955) 0.2739 
Sales 
experience 
-0.2337 
(0.1279) 
-0.2623 
(0.1937) 0.1093 
Clerical 
experience 
0.0255 
(0.0883) 
0.0713 
(0.1468) 0.6424 
Craftsmen 
experience 
0.0943 
(0.0594) 
0.1882 
(0.1207) 0.4990 
Operatives 
experience 
0.0370 
(0.0575) 
0.1673 
(0.1032) 0.7788 
Laborer 
experience 
0.3250 
(0.0910) 
0.4753 
(0.1501) 0.3163 
Service 
experience 
-0.4093 
(0.0654) 
-0.4625 
(0.0884) 0.1150 
Previously a 
professional 
0.943 
(0.484) 
0.175 
(0.695) 0.1975 
Previously a 
manager 
0.609 
(0.400) 
0.129 
(0.776) 0.4604 
Previously 
sales 
0.604 
(0.699) 
0.754 
(0.707) 0.1989 
Previously 
clerical 
1.310 
(0.354) 
1.322 
(0.351) 0.0096 
Previously a 
craftsman 
1.525 
(0.240) 
1.832 
(0.435) 0.1673 
Previously an 
operative 
1.139 
(0.204) 
0.976 
(0.311) 0.1675 
Previously a 
laborer 
1.870 
(0.213) 
1.579 
(0.331) 0.1846 
                            Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 6 Panel C: Parameter Estimates – Unobserved Heterogeneity: Classification 
Error Model 
 
 Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  
Non-pecuniary intercepts Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error 
Professional  -4.7210 0.3270 -4.1600 0.2920 -2.8250 0.3810 
Managers  -3.1880 0.0930 -3.0920 0.1770 -2.2050 0.2510 
Sales  -6.1960 0.4940 -0.9120 0.3780 0.0160 0.3850 
Clerical  -1.7920 0.3340 -1.7200 0.3460 -0.5640 0.3520 
Craftsmen  -0.1250 0.2410 -0.0660 0.2260 0.5370 0.3130 
Operatives 0.0310 0.2470 0.0570 0.2310 0.6560 0.3100 
Laborers 0.3220 0.2590 0.4030 0.2180 1.2000 0.3180 
Wage intercepts       
Professional  1.9360 0.0220 1.1810 0.0250 1.6380 0.0220 
Managers  1.4510 0.0350 1.0740 0.0260 1.5990 0.0360 
Sales  2.3700 0.2600 -0.2990 0.1770 0.2740 0.1850 
Clerical  1.4400 0.0380 1.1220 0.0450 1.5480 0.0300 
Craftsmen  1.6460 0.0260 1.3670 0.0250 1.9630 0.0300 
Operatives 1.6220 0.0240 1.3810 0.0230 1.9710 0.0260 
Laborers 1.4130 0.0480 1.3000 0.0470 1.7150 0.0420 
Service  1.5020 0.0310 1.0620 0.0240 0.0010 0.1240 
Type probabilities       
Pr(Type 1) 0.1216 .032     
Pr(Type 2) 0.3675 .041     
Pr(Type 3)     .5109 .042     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel C: Parameter Estimates – Unobserved Heterogeneity: Model that 
Ignores Classification Error 
 
 Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  
Non-pecuniary intercepts Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error 
Professional  -3.6890 0.3330 -3.4730 0.3160 -2.1610 0.3520 
Managers  -2.4600 0.3300 -2.5340 0.3060 -1.5880 0.3640 
Sales  -7.2570 0.7340 -2.0600 0.4340 -1.0310 0.4350 
Clerical  -1.8030 0.2820 -2.0260 0.2860 -0.9600 0.3590 
Craftsmen  -0.1680 0.2170 -0.3450 0.2110 0.5080 0.2910 
Operatives -0.1820 0.2210 -0.1820 0.2180 0.5370 0.2930 
Laborers -0.0110 0.2560 -0.0090 0.2420 0.6280 0.3030 
Wage intercepts
      
Professional  1.7720 0.0630 1.0550 0.0610 1.5460 0.0600 
Managers  1.3740 0.0750 0.9420 0.0720 1.4420 0.0720 
Sales  1.8580 0.1800 -0.0220 0.1420 0.4980 0.1390 
Clerical  1.4640 0.0470 1.1000 0.0510 1.5630 0.0490 
Craftsmen  1.5540 0.0320 1.2910 0.0300 1.8530 0.0340 
Operatives 1.5590 0.0380 1.3020 0.0360 1.7940 0.0360 
Laborers 1.4670 0.0570 1.2880 0.0550 1.7770 0.0600 
Service  1.4630 0.0520 1.0170 0.0480 1.3190 0.0690 
Type probabilities       
Pr(Type 1) 0.0456 .033     
Pr(Type 2) 0.5030 .039     
Pr(Type 3) .4514 .040     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Panel C: Average Wage & Non-pecuniary Intercepts Across Types 
Average non-pecuniary 
intercepts (φ’s) 
Ignore classification 
error 
Correct for 
classification error 
% absolute deviation 
Professional  -2.890 -3.546 0.184 
Managers  -2.103 -2.650 0.206 
Sales  -1.832 -1.080 0.696 
Clerical  -1.534 -1.138 0.347 
Craftsmen  0.048 0.234 0.795 
Operatives 0.142 0.359 0.603 
Laborers 0.278 0.800 0.652 
Average wage intercepts (μ’s) 
   
Professional  1.309 1.506 0.130 
Managers  1.187 1.388 0.144 
Sales  0.298 0.318 0.062 
Clerical  1.325 1.378 0.038 
Craftsmen  1.556 1.705 0.087 
Operatives 1.535 1.711 0.102 
Laborers 1.516 1.525 0.005 
Service  1.173 0.5734 1.046 
            Note: Averages computed across types. 
 
Table 7: Completed Education by Observed Occupation for Correctly Classified 
and Misclassified Occupational Choices 
Observed Occupation in NLSY 
Data 
 % No College 
Completed 
% College 
Graduate 
Professional  Correctly classified Misclassified 
10.8% 
48.6% 
71.8% 
30.2% 
Managers  Correctly classified Misclassified 
39.8% 
47.2% 
36.8% 
28.7% 
Sales  Correctly classified Misclassified 
25.2% 
44.8% 
54.2% 
24.7% 
Clerical  Correctly classified Misclassified 
54.9% 
36.0% 
23.7% 
49.0% 
Craftsmen  Correctly classified Misclassified 
77.9% 
53.3% 
2.1% 
18.7% 
Operatives Correctly classified Misclassified 
85.2% 
61.3% 
2.5% 
21.5% 
Laborers Correctly classified Misclassified 
83.7% 
73.0% 
3.2% 
11.7% 
Service  Correctly classified Misclassified 
60.2% 
74.2% 
13.7% 
8.1% 
Notes: Generated using the simulated data that identifies occupational choices as correctly or incorrectly 
classified. The “correctly classified” row refers to observations where the occupation in the leftmost 
column matches the true occupation code generated by the model. The “misclassified” row refers to 
observations where a person is observed in the occupation in the leftmost column and the simulated true 
occupation differs from the observed occupation. So, 71.8% of correctly classified professionals graduated 
from college, while only 30.2% of those incorrectly classified as professionals graduated from college. 
Table 8: Distribution of Total Number of Times a Person’s Occupational Choices 
are Misclassified Over the Career 
 
# of times misclassified Subpopulation 2 Subpopulation 3 All 
0 32.8% 30.4% 57.2% 
1 28.4% 27.0% 17.6% 
2 18.8% 17.4% 11.5% 
3 9.9% 10.1% 6.3% 
4 4.2% 5.9% 3.0% 
5 3.1% 4.4% 2.2% 
6-9 2.5% 4.4% 1.9% 
>9 .37% .26% .20% 
 Entries are the frequencies of the number of times that a person’s occupational choices are 
misclassified over the course of the career based on the simulated data. For example, in 
Subpopulation 2, 9.9% of individuals in the simulated data have their occupational choices 
misclassified three times over the course of their career. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Distribution of Lengths of Misclassification Spells 
 
# of consecutive times 
misclassified 
Subpopulation 2 Subpopulation 3 All 
1 73.2% 72.2% 72.9% 
2 18.2% 18.5% 18.3% 
3 4.9% 5.8% 5.2% 
4 2.2% .9% 1.8% 
5 .47% 1.3% .7% 
>5 .83% 1.1% .93% 
 Entries are the frequencies of the number of consecutive times that a person’s occupational 
choices are misclassified. For example, in subpopulation 2, conditional on having an occupational 
choice misclassified, 18.2% of these choices are misclassified for two consecutive survey 
observations.
 
Table 10: Average True Choice Probabilities by Observed Choice and Wage Percentile 
Observed/Actual  Professional Managers Sales Clerical Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service 
Professional  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.909 
.953 
.757 
.000 
.001 
.001 
.074 
.006 
.053 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.013 
.020 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.004 
.012 
.070 
.011 
.014 
.095 
Managers  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.052 
.020 
.010 
.565 
.858 
.544 
.374 
.067 
.272 
.001 
.002 
.004 
.002 
.003 
.004 
.000 
.002 
.005 
.000 
.001 
.012 
.005 
.046 
.148 
Sales  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.039 
.033 
.004 
.033 
.018 
.005 
.916 
.911 
.834 
.017 
.000 
.016 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.002 
.007 
.000 
.002 
.007 
.038 
.026 
.127 
Clerical  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.039 
.033 
.004 
.005 
.017 
.005 
.916 
.911 
.834 
.001 
.008 
.016 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.002 
.007 
.000 
.002 
.007 
.038 
.026 
.127 
Craftsmen  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.031 
.008 
.005 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.091 
.015 
.124 
.000 
.000 
.003 
.872 
.965 
.818 
.000 
.002 
.005 
.003 
.007 
.041 
.000 
.000 
.002 
Operatives 
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.084 
.009 
.003 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.110 
.008 
.119 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.801 
.979 
     .869 
.003 
.003 
.006 
.000 
.000 
.000 
Laborers 
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.065 
.003 
.071 
.012 
.007 
.004 
.032 
.008 
.003 
.002 
.003 
.002 
.885 
.976 
.915 
.003 
.001 
.004 
Service  
Top 10% 
Middle 10% 
Bottom 10% 
.054 
.005 
.000 
.004 
.001 
.000 
.072 
.001 
.100 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.150 
.251 
.174 
.719 
.732 
.725 
 Note: Entries are the average true choice probabilities found in the simulated data conditional on the observed choice and wage. Top, middle, and 
bottom 10% refer to the location of the observed wage in the wage distribution of the observed occupation.
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